تحولات ماهیتی از هندوئیسم به هنر اسلامی

Iconic Transformations from Hinduism to Islamic Art

Abstract

The strategic location of the Malay Peninsula at the Straits of Malacca became the key attraction to the successful trade route between the East and the West. It became the meeting point for traders who not only brought their trades but also their religious belief system. Since the beginning of the Christian era, other religious culture such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam had arrived the shores of the Peninsula. The coming of Hinduism in 500 AD has brought an end to animist culture of the Malay people. Gradually Indian belief system became the embodiment of Malay art and culture not only in the form of literary Sanskrit words but also in carved wood and textiles to fulfi ll religious devotions and the daily utilitarian needs. Therefore, the objectives for this paper are (1) to investigate how Hindu worldview infl uences the form and content of its artistic element in selected fi eldwoodcarving and textiles, (2) to postulate the Malay-Islamic aesthetic principles derived from the Qur’an and hadith, and (3) to discuss the transformation from Hindu icons to Islamic worldview in art. The appropriate approaches that merged and integrated with the iconic elements of such transformations are determined. In addition, based from the key evolution factors of Hindu characteristics, several samples of iconic images were identifi ed and classifi ed. The samples presented justifi ed when Islam came to the Malay Peninsula in the fi fteenth century; it has brought Hinduism to an end. Indeed, through the whole Islamization process, Islam has transformed the body and soul of the Malay mind. It shaped both religious and spiritual vision of reality specifi cally in terms of artistic and cultural expressions.

1 Introduction

The Malay Peninsula’s position where three ocean worlds came together was the key attraction to the successful trade route between the Indian continent and the Far East. It became the meeting point for traders who not only brought along their trades but also their religious belief system. Since the beginning of the Christian era, various religious cultures such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam had arrived the shores of the Peninsula. According to an eminent Muslim scholar, Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, the coming of Islam to the Malay world in the thirteenth century constitutes a momentous event that decisively shaped both the worldview and ethos of the Malay society [ 1 ]. Islam not only shaped the religious and spiritual vision of reality but also its artistic and cultural expressions of the Malays. Such infl uences were visible in various traditional forms including performance, literary, sound, and visual art. Specifi cally in traditional Malay art, the impact of Islamization of the Malay world has profoundly affected signifi cant change in the iconography, morphology, and their functions in the Malay society. However, the shift of worldview from Hindu Buddhism to Islam did not result in a drastic change especially in the manifestation of the Hindu traditional art forms due to the ingenuity of Sufi masters who were able to accommodate what was permissible in Islam that gradually dovetailed with the new faith [ 2 ].

The impact of Islamic tradition of the Malay woodcarving and textiles is still pervasive after more than fi ve decades when Malaysia gained her independence. Impressive woodcarving work adorned the interiors of grand palaces throughout the country. In the hands of traditional Malay woodcarver, it is the profound understanding and beliefs of the Malays’ aesthetic principles that exude in their elaborate expressions and confounding patterns and composition that astonish the viewers. It is here that the local genius of traditional Malay woodcarver as the artist observes and interprets the ambience that surrounds him [ 3 ]. As posited by scholars, the traditional Malay art forms are but the visual embodiment of the spiritual and moral- ethical values of the Malay society. Apart from their importance as everyday ceremonial utilitarian artifacts, they have numerous other functions as religious hangings, royal insignia, sacred talisman, and others for they are all interconnected with religious and political organizations, marriage, social status, and exchange purposes. As a corollary, it is only by seeing these art forms in their cultural context that we can understand their true value and meaning [ 4 ]. Thus, this paper attempts to discuss iconic transformation from Hinduism to Malay-Islamic art forms specifi cally in woodcarving and textiles. First, it will delve briefl y the historical background of these icons in the Malay Peninsula during the pre-Islamic period; this is to provide the background of such art forms before cultural transformation. Second, the coming of Islam and its worldview in art and culture of the Malay people will be elucidated. And third, this paper will postulate on the change and transformations of Hindu icons to accommodate the Islamic aesthetic principles.

شبه واقع گرایی

Semirealism

2. Entities: Detection Properties, Auxiliary Properties

Entity realism holds that most of the entities referred to in scientific theories are actual inhabitants of an external, mind-independent reality. It is this aspect of theory—the existence of particular theoretical entities—that we may reasonably believe to be true. ER has proven uncontroversial (so long as no one invites the opinion of the idealist or solipsist) where macroscopic objects are concerned, for it is claimed that the reality of such objects is clearly demonstrated by simple ostensive presentation. Those objects too small to be detected by the naked eye, on the other hand, have suffered remarkable discrimination. Recent debate has addressed van Fraassen’s (1980, p. 12) claim that acceptance of a scientific theory entails, or should entail, only the belief that it is empirically adequate, meaning that ‘what it says about the observable things and events in this world is true’. Newton-Smith (1981, pp. 19–28) discusses the contention that claims concerning unobservables are riskier, given that their detection depends upon sophisticated equipment and theoretical assumptions, and that for this reason observables are epistemically privileged. The case, however, for denying that different epistemic attitudes with respect to entity existence should be brought to bear on information derived from the employment of human sensory modalities in isolation, as opposed to information obtained from combinations of human and technological sensory machinery, has been made persuasively. Thus, resolving not to go the way of discrimination, let us invoke a commonplace regarding why it is that we believe in the objects of our perceptions: we believe that our sensory experience is brought about by the very things of which we have experience. Objects exist, and they affect us in such a way that we are confident, by virtue of their affecting us (us perceiving them), that they exist. Admittedly, this is vague, but it may be the best that we can do. At the very least, let us elaborate on what it might mean to ‘be affected’ or to ‘perceive’ in the manner indicated. This we do in terms of a familiar story about how empirical information is acquired by the human subject: things happen in the world, some of these things interact with our sensory apparatus, sensory machinery translates this information into signals which are processed by the brain, we perceive. In other words, information about real entities in the world is communicated to us by a causal chain of events; it is on the basis of such causal chains that we believe these entities to exist. We can and do believe in the existence of external objects pre-philosophically, but once we stop to justify such beliefs, we are driven to explanations in terms of causal interactions. The version of the pessimistic induction alluded to above seemingly represents no threat to ER, since this argument reasons from the falsity of past theories, but not specifically past failure of reference on the part of theory terms, to doubts about current theories. Let us, however, intensify the challenge of the pessimistic induction. Consider the idea that the meanings of entity terms are to some extent defined by the theories in which they occur. How can we ascribe reality to some object x, if it turns out that we were, and may well now be wrong about what x is? Is it intelligible to assert that x exists, and yet be open to the possibility that our conception of x (the set of defining properties with which a particular theory picks out x) may change? If the meaning of ‘x’ changes, to what extent can we be said to be discussing the same entity? According to certain referential models of meaning (discussed by Kitcher (1993, pp. 76–78), and earlier by Putnam (1975, pp. 249–251, 269)), the set of descriptions with which any given referent is picked out may evolve, while the collection of modes of reference continues to refer to the same entity. It is this picture of meaning that we adopt when we say that Thomson, Lorentz, Bohr, and Millikan were all concerned with the same entity: the electron. To whatever extent our concepts and detections of observable and/or unobservable objects are theory laden, this should not stand in the way of legitimate beliefs in the existence of putative entities, however we may conceptualize them with different theories. Thus our beliefs with respect to the existence of causal agents need not suffer with changes in our attitudes toward the theories in which such agents play a role. And what about that rogues’ gallery of non-referring entity terms from celebrated theories of the past—‘phlogiston’, ‘ether’, and their ilk—do they not speak volumes against the wisdom of adopting ER?2 If there is anything intrinsic to practices of detection that suggests which causal agents will survive theoretical changes, it is the possibility of corroboration by alternative forms of detection. The greater the extent to which such corroboration takes the form of theoretically independent evidence, the greater its power of confirmation.3 Highly corroborated entities are vindicated and take their place in our ontology; those that cannot be substantiated by this form of risk management more often than not take their place in the ‘failures’ chapter of our history of scientific ideas. It may be instructive to think about why the above reformulated version of the pessimistic induction is generally targeted at unobservable entities. I suggest the reason is that our prima facie intuitions lead us to believe that unobservables are particularly susceptible to such arguments. Thus, it is thought obvious that both my opponent in the debate, the president of the flat earth society, and I refer to the same object when we speak of ‘the earth’. Here we identify an entity despite differences in associated properties, about which we could argue all day. The same, of course, applies to the example of different theorists and their views on the electron, and to other corroborated unobservables, thus telling against our prima facie intuitions. But now we seem to have muddled things up, for surely we identify objects on the basis of certain properties—namely, those described by causal processes in virtue of which entities interact with our means of detection—and yet simultaneously we speak of identifying objects in spite of differences in the properties we attribute to them. Just what sorts of properties are we talking about here? In his discussion of ER, Devitt (1991, p. 46) contrasts the position with what he portrays as the alternative for the realist, ‘theory realism’, which he describes as ‘a stronger metaphysical doctrine’ according to which ‘science is mostly right, not only about which unobservables exist, but also about their properties’. But as the confusion cited above suggests, this may be painting with too broad a stroke. A more refined consideration of properties is required if we are to make sense of the seeming tension between identifying an object and differing about its attributes. For one thing, it is not clear that all properties are of the same type; distinguishing kinds of properties may in fact distinguish forms of realist commitment. What sorts of properties allow us to establish the existence of an entity? The answer, according to the account given above, is those properties which delimit causal interactions and which are, by virtue of this fact, exploited by us by way of detection. We infer entity existence on the basis of perceptions grounded upon certain causal regularities having to do with interactions between objects. Let us thus define detection properties as those upon which the causal regularities of our detections depend, or in virtue of which these regularities are manifested. Auxiliary properties, then, are those associated with the object under consideration, but not essential (in the sense that we do not appeal to them) in establishing existence claims. Attributions of auxiliary properties function to supplement our descriptions, helping to fill out our conceptual pictures of objects under investigation. Theories enumerate both detection and auxiliary properties of entities, but only the former are tied to perceptual experience. Perhaps an example will clarify the property distinction at issue. In a paper on structural realism, Worrall (1989) features the case study of transition from the wave optics of Fresnel to the electromagnetic theory of Maxwell. Worrall considers a set of equations developed by Fresnel, relating intensities of reflected and refracted light to that of an incident beam passing from one medium into another of different optical density.

مقاله انگلیسی رایگان

ترجمه فارسی رایگان 

فهرست مقاله:

چکیده
بررسی تاریخ از لحاظ جامعه شناختی
مورخین و جامعه شناسان: مقایسه
دسته های تجزیه و تحلیل
شرح داستان
نتیجه گیری

بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله:

 چکیده
اغلب استفاده از تئوری اجتماعی برای رویدادها و اتفاقات گذشته، تعریف نشده است؛ جامعه شناسی تاریخی در واقع روشی متمایز برای درک، توضیح و تفسیر مشکلات عمومی جامعه شناختی است. با قرار دادن اقدامات و ساختارهای اجتماعی در حوزه های تاریخی و با بررسی تحولات تاریخی خود، جامعه شناسان تاریخی از دارایی زندگی اجتماعی بهره بردند، به سوالات و اهمیت دائمی نظریه های اجتماعی پاسخ دادند. بر اساس پیشینه تحقیقات اخیر انجام شده در هر دو رشته جامعه شناسی و تاریخ استدلال می کنم که باید بتوانیم “گسترش تاریخی” رشته ای عمیق تر با تاریخ نگاری را ادامه دهیم که ما چگونه تحقیق را انجام، درک و از مفاهیم تحلیلی پایه استفاده کنیم، و نظریه های اجتماعی عمومی را توسعه و تست کنیم. از زمان آغاز رشته ما، جامعه شناسان عمیقا سوال در مورد این موضوع دارند که آیا تاریخ به عنوان یک “انبار نمونه” درک می شود (مور 1958: 131) یا به عنوان تست برای توسعه نظریه جامعه شناسی مورد استفاده قرار می گیرد یا به جای آن، به عنوان چیزی که اهمیت دارد به درستی درک شود (اریکسون 1970، اسکاکپول 1984، زستومکا 1986، تیلی 1981)
پیامدهای این بحث برای عمل جامعه شناختی، همانطور که بعدا خواهیم دید، بسیار عمیق است. در حالی که مناقشه هنوز خشمگین است، واضح است که بخش مهمی از این رشته در حال حاضر اهمیت واقعی در قدرت تاریخ برای توضیح سازمانی جامعه شناسی دارد. شواهدی برای این دیده شده است (1) تعداد روزافزون مقالات مهم جامعه شناسی تاریخی که در نشریات عمومی مهم ما وجود دارد، (2) رشد تعداد و دیدگاه مجلات، به صراحت برای ادغام تاریخ و علوم اجتماعی طراحی شده است (به عنوان مثال، مطالعات تطبیقی در جامعه و تاریخ، مجله جامعه شناسی تاریخی و تاریخ علوم اجتماعی) .(3) در تخصیص اخیر روش شناختی ابزارهای تحلیلی نظیر روایت، رویداد و بیوگرافی که بعدها تقریبا به طور انحصاری برای مورخین و سایر انسان گرایان حفظ شد (آبرامز 1982؛ اسحاق، استریت و ناپف 1994؛ سئول ND)؛ و (4) تعداد زیادی از کتاب ها مؤثر ، حتی دارای جایزه، تاریخ و جامعه شناسی را در روش های هوشمندانه و هیجان انگیز ادغام می کنند (گلدستون 1991؛ اسکاکپول 1979، ؛ کوآداگنو 1994).
چگونه جامعه شناسان معاصر در حقیقت از تاریخ در تحقیقات خود استفاده می کنند، شواهد بیشتری در مورد ادغام تاریخ و جامعه شناسی وجود دارد. در زیر من سه کتاب را که اهداف، روشها و نظریه های آنها به اندازه کافی متنوع است، بررسی می کنم که در آن مجموعه پیشنهادی آنها، بسیاری از محدوده تاریخ جامعه شناسی امروز را نشان می دهد: بری شوارتز (1987) جورج واشنگتن: ساخت یک نماد آمریکایی، تی هدا اسکاکپول (1992)، محافظت از سربازان و مادران: ریشه های سیاسی سیاست های اجتماعی در ایالات متحده، استوارت تولنای و ای ام بک (1995) جشنواره خشونت: تجزیه و تحلیل لینچینگ جنوبی ، 1882-1930.
هر یک از این نویسندگان سوالاتی را مطرح و به آنها پاسخ می دهند که در اصل ماهیت تاریخی دارند؛ یعنی، آنها تجارب تاریخی افراد مهم و خلاقیت های اجتماعی را مشخص می کنند که از لحاظ تاریخی با انگیزه، انعطاف پذیر و معنی دار هستند. در مورد اسکاکپول، وی می خواست بدانید، در میان موارد دیگر، هر دو حقوق بازنشستگی جنگ داخلی به یک فرم منحصر به فرد “آمریکایی” از بیمه اجتماعی تبدیل شده و این سیستم مانع تبدیل شدن به یک برنامه جامع اجتماعی برای کارگران و سالمندان می شود.
تولنی و بک می خواستند بفهمند چرا سفیدپوستان جنوبی، سیاهپوستان آفریقایی آمریکایی را اذیت می کنند و دست کم برخی از عواقب آن – الگوهای مهاجرت، به عنوان مثال – از این وحشت فراگیر جنوبی درک می شوند.
در نهایت، شوارتز می خواست بداند چگونه مرحوم جورج واشنگتن به یک مقبره زنده محترم تبدیل شد و سپس اهمیت مکتب تفکر واشنگتن در امریکا ر ا تشخیص داد. تاکید بر ماهیت “تاریخی” این سه مطالعه، به این معنی نیست که آنها در هیچ معنا و مفهومی نظری نیستند.
هر سه کتاب به طور مستقیم بر روی سوالات دائمی سازمان اجتماعی، کنترل اجتماعی و تغییر اجتماعی تحقیق می کنند، و نویسندگان هر سه به صراحت مسائل را مطرح می کنند که به لحاظ تاریخی به طور مشخص نظری هستند. هر کدام توجه زیادی به پیدایش نظری و پیامدهای پژوهش او دارند و هر کدام از تاریخ برای پیشبرد نظریه استفاده می کند.
به عنوان مثال، اسکاکپول نظریه “محور متمرکز” دولت و سیاست متشکل از تاریخی و متمرکز را توسعه داد. تولنی و بک برخی از توضیحات تئوری را برای آزار و اذیت جنوبی ها پذیرفتند – به عنوان مثال کسانی که به انگیزه های اقتصادی و الزامات اشاره می کنند و بعضی دیگر سیستم عدالت کیفری ضعیف را رد می کنند و شوارتز تشکر رسمی ما را در مورد آنچه که مردم با یکدیگر اختلاف دارند، یعنی عملکرد اجتماعی سنت، مراسم و تشریفات مذهبی و در هم آمیختگی زندگی سیاسی و مذهبی را تشدید می کند.
اما هیچ کدام از نویسندگان مذکور تاریخ را فقط به عنوان “پس زمینه” برای آنچه که “واقعا مهم” بود، درک و یا آن را تکثیر نمی کنند: یعنی اکتشاف و استنتاج جامعه شناختی (مراجعه کنید به اسکاکپول 1992 ) شوارتز از تاریخ بهره مفید را برد تا آنچه را که تفسیر پروژه خواستار آن بود، مورد سوءاستفاده قرار دهد: تفکر روانشناختی جمعی اولیه آمریکایی ها، نخبگان و اراذل اوباش به طور یکسان هستند، که مشتاقانه تلاش می کردند درک خود از جمهوریخواهی را افزایش دهند. تولنی و بک از لحاظ تاریخی معنی و کارکرد نظریه های مورد بررسی را تحلیل و تحلیل های آماری خود را به صورت تاریخی بررسی می کند و سپس از تاریخ برای شناخت یافته های آماری پیچیده خود استفاده می کند.
سرانجام، اسکاکپول اظهار می کند تاریخچه هر دو زنان و روابط جنسیتی در آمریکا، درک نظری او را در مورد شکل گیری سیاست ها تشکیل می دهد و جنبه های آن تاریخ – که به عنوان سیاست های هویت شناختی و “تکثیر” سیاست های اجتماعی را مفهومی می کند، برای او ابزار مهم توضیحی می شود.
سپس هر کدام از آنها تاریخ را در تحلیل خود متمرکز کرده و توضیحات و تفسیرهای جامعه شناختی که از لحاظ تاریخی آگاه و تاریخی بوده اند، شکل گرفته است تاریخ ما را به وضعیت یک انبار نمونه نمی رساند، تاریخی ناامیدکننده و مکانیکی فقط از طریق برخی از نظریه های پیشین، تحریک شده است. ما همچنین حس نمی کنیم که تئوری اجتماعی به نوعی بالاتر، خارج و یا از نظر تاریخی مستقل است. در عوض، تاریخ و نظریه در این مطالعات در یک سفر کشف شد که در آن پاسخ به سوالات مطبوعات جامعه شناختی قبل از تحقیق و تجزیه و تحلیل تاریخی کامل نشده است، ادغام شدند. این مطالعات، همانطور که بسیاری از جامعه شناسی تاریخ معاصر را انجام می دهد، قدردانی از پیچیدگی ها، احتمالات، استثنائات و کنایه ها نه فقط برای بدست آوردن حقوق تاریخ بلکه برای “درست شدن تاریخ باید همچنان حفظ و بازپس گرفته شود، بلکه برای ما مهمتر” دریافت جامعه شناسی درست است “. و من فکر می کنم این درست است که آیا قصد تحلیل و توضیح آنچه که در تاریخ رخ داده است را دارید یا خیر و به همین دلیل است که آن رخ می دهد همانطورکه انجام می شود، یا برای مشاهده تاریخ همانطورکه دیدگاه تفسیر که ما ممکن است معنای فرهنگی، ایجاد آیکون های فرهنگی، افسانه ها، و نهادینه سازی و بیان حافظه جمعی را درک کنیم.
این سه کتاب فقط ظاهر قضیه آشکار شدن وزن است. بنابراین ارتباط صمیمی بین تاریخ و جامعه شناسی در بعضی عرصه ها است و عرصه هایی بسیار مهم است که ساختار نهادی و فکری رشته ما هستند(آبات 1991) که من اعتقاد دارم صحبت کردن در مورد انقلاب تاریخی “مدرن” در جامعه شناسی درست است: تئوری جامعه شناختی، روش شناسی و تحقیق، مسلما بیش از هر زمان در زندگی رشته ای در این کشور بیشتر از خودآگاهانه با سوالات و دیدگاه های تاریخی آگاهی دارند

بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:

Abstract

Often mischaracterized as merely the application of social theory to past events and happenings, historical sociology is actually a distinct way of approaching, explaining, and interpreting general sociological problems. By situating social action and social structures in their historical contexts and by examining their historical unfoldings, historical sociologists exploit the temporality of social life to ask and answer questions of perennial importance to social theory. I draw on recent research and literature both in sociology and in history to argue that we should and can continue to deepen the discipline’s “historical turn” by more thoroughly historicizing how we conduct research, understand and use basic analytic concepts, and develop and test general social theories. Since the beginning of our discipline, sociologists have been deeply divided over the question of whether history is to be understood as a “storehouse of samples” (Moore 1958:131) to be used as a testing ground for the development of sociological theory, or, alternatively, as something of importance to be comprehended in its own right (Erikson 1970; Skocpol 1984; Sztompka 1986; Tilly 1981). The implications of this debate for sociological practice are, as we will see later, quite profound. While the dispute still rages, it is clear that an important segment of the discipline now places real importance on the power of history to elucidate the sociological enterprise. Evidence for this is seen (1) in the increasing number of genuinely historical sociology articles appearing in our more important general journals, (2) in the growth in the number and visibility of journals explicitly designed to integrate history and social science (e.g., Comparative Studies in Society and History, the Journal of Historical Sociology, and Social Science History), (3) in the recent methodological appropriation of analytic tools such as narrative, event, and biography which were once thought reserved almost exclusively for historians and other humanists (Abrams 1982; Isaac, Street & Knapp 1994; Sewell N.d.), and (4) in the large number of fine, even awardwinning, books effectively integrating history and sociology in intellectually informative and exciting ways (Goldstone 1991; Skocpol 1979; Quadagno 1994). How contemporary sociologists actually use history in their research is the most telling evidence of the interpenetration of history and sociology. Below I discuss three books whose objectives, methods, and theories are sufficiently diverse that, when viewed as a set, they suggest much of the range of historical sociology today: Barry Schwartz’s (1987) George Washington: The Mlaking of An American Symbol, Theda Skocpol’s (1992) Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States, and Stewart Tolnay and E.M. Beck’s (1995) Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930. Each of these authors pose and answer questions that are intrinsically historical in nature; that is, they characterize the historical experiences of concrete people and of social creations that were themselves historically motivated, encapsulated, and meaningful. In Skocpol’s case, she wanted to understand, among other things, both how Civil War pensions were transmuted into a uniquely “American” form of social insurance and what prevented this system from becoming a more inclusive social security program for workers and the elderly. Tolnay and Beck wanted to understand why Southern whites lynched Southern African Americans and to grasp at least some of the consequences – migration patterns, for example – of this pervasive Southern horror. Schwartz, finally, wanted to understand how a mortal, George Washington, was transformed into a much venerated living monument and then to discern the significance of the Washington cult for the meaning of America. By emphasizing the “historical” nature of these three studies, I am not implying that they are in any sense atheoretical. All three books bear directly on enduring questions of social organization, social control, and social change, and the authors of all three plainly raise issues that are as distinctly theoretical as they are historical. Each devotes considerable attention to the theoretical genesis and implications of her or his research, and each uses history to advance theory. Skocpol, for example, developed a nuanced and historically rich “polity centered” theory of state and politics. Tolnay and Beck embraced some theoretical explanations for Southern lynching – those pointing to economic motives and requirements, for example – and discounted others, such as a weak criminal justice system. And Schwartz deepened our general appreciation of what holds a diverse people together, the social functions of tradition, ritual and ceremony, and the interpenetration of political and religious life. But none of these authors understood or reproduced history as mere “background” for what was “really important”: that is, sociological theoxy and inference (see Skocpol 1992:x). Schwartz exploited history to do what his interpretive project demanded: the recreation of the collective mentalities of early Americans, elite and rabble alike, who were anxiously trying to live their understanding of republicanism. Tolnay and Beck historically contextualized the meaning and operation of the theories they examined, historicized their statistical analysis, and then used history to make sense of their complex statistical findings. Skocpol, finally, acknowledged both how the history of women and of gender relations in America shaped her theoretical understanding of policy formation and that aspects of that history – conceptualized as identity politics and the “gendering” of social policy – became for her an important explanatory device. Each of them, then, centrally incorporated history into his or her analysis and fashioned historically informed and historically grounded sociological explanations and interpretations. Skocpol, Schwartz, and Tolnay and Beck do not give us history reduced to the status of a storehouse of samples, a lifeless, mechanistic history evoked only to be cranked through some prefigured theory. Nor do we get a sense that social theory is somehow above, outside or otherwise independent of history. Rather, history and theory were merged in these studies in a voyage of discovery in which answers to pressing sociological questions were not known before the historical research and analysis were completed. These studies, as does much contemporary historical sociology, kindle appreciation of why history’s complexities, contingencies, exceptions, and ironies must be preserved and recaptured not only to “get the history right” but also, and more important for us, to “get the sociology right.” And I think this is true whether the analytic intent is to explain what happened in history and why it happened as it did, or to view history as an interpretive lens through which we may perceive cultural meaning, the creation of cultural icons and myths, and the institutionalization and expression of collective memory. These three books are but the tip of an iceberg of looming weight. So intimate now is the relationship between history and sociology in some arenas, and so important are those arenas to the institutional and intellectual make-up of our discipline (Abbott 1991), that I believe it accurate to speak of an accomplished “modem” historical revolution in sociology: sociological theory, methodology, and research arguably are more self-consciously informed by historical questions and perspectives than at any time in the life of the discipline in this country.