دانلود رایگان ترجمه مقاله هدف و روش های تحلیلی تعادل عمومی اقتصاد – Jstor 1974
دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی تعادل عمومی اقتصادی :هدف، فنون تحلیلی، گزینش جمعی به همراه ترجمه فارسی
عنوان فارسی مقاله | تعادل عمومی اقتصادی :هدف، فنون تحلیلی، گزینش جمعی |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله | General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, Collective Choice |
رشته های مرتبط | علوم اقتصادی، توسعه اقتصادی و برنامه ریزی، اقتصاد نظری |
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نشریه | Jstor |
مجله | بررسی اقتصاد آمریكایی – THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW |
سال انتشار | 1974 |
کد محصول | F833 |
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جستجوی ترجمه مقالات | جستجوی ترجمه مقالات علوم اقتصادی |
فهرست مقاله: 1- هماهنگی و کارایی سیستم اقتصادی |
بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله: من نمی خواهم تا در مورد موضوغ اغراق کنم. تعادل عرضه و تقاضا تقریبا به حد کمال خود رسیده است. یک مسئله مشهود این است که تاریخچه سیستم سرمایه داری با دوره های مکرر و متناوبی همراه بوده است که در آن عرضه نیروی کار قابل دسترس و تجهیزات کارامد قابل دسترس برای تولید کالاها، مازاد بر استفاده آن ها بوده است همان طور که در دهه 1930 این مقدار بسیار چشم گیر تر بود. به علاوه، تعادل نسبی عرضه و تقاضای کل در دوره پس از جنگ در امریکا و اروپا، یک شاخص خوب از نتایج سیاست های دولتی می باشد و نشان دهنده روند خودکار تعادل بازاری نیست. |
بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی: I do not want to overstate the case. The balancing of supply and demand is far from perfect. Most conspicuously, the history of the capitalist system has been marked by recurring periods in which the supply of available labor and of productive equipment available for the production of goods has been in excess of their utilization, sometimes, as in the 1930’s, by very considerable magnitudes. Further, the relative balance of overall supply and demand in the postwar period in the United States and Europe is in good measure the result of deliberate governmental policies, not an automatic tendency of the market to balance. Nevertheless, when all due allowances are made, the coherence of individual economic decisions is remarkable. As incomes rise and demands shift, for example, from food to clothing and housing, the labor force and productive facilities follow suit. Similarly, and even more surprising to the layman, there is a mutual interaction between shifts in technology and the allocation of the labor force. As technology improves exogenously, through innovations, the labor made redundant does not become permanently unemployed but finds its place in the economy. It is truly amazing that the lessons of both theory and over a century of history are still so misunderstood. On the other hand, a growing accumulation of instruments of production raises real wages and in turn induces a rise in the prices of labor-intensive commodities relative to those which use little labor. All these phenomena show that by and large and in the long view of history, the economic system adjusts with a considerable degree of smoothness and indeed of rationality to changes in the fundamental facts within which it operates. The problematic nature of economic coordination is most obvious in a free enterprise economy but might seem of lesser moment in a socialist or planned society. But a little reflection on the production and consumption decisions of such a society, at least in the modern world of complex production, shows that in the most basic aspects the problem of coordination is not removed by the transition to socialism or to any other form of planning. In the pure model of a free enterprise world, an individual, whether consumer or producer, is the locus both of interests or tastes and of information. Each individual has his own desires, which he is expected to pursue within the constraints imposed by the economic mechanism; but in addition he is supposed to have more information about himself or at least about a particular sphere of productive and consumptive activity than other individuals. It might be that in an ideal socialist economy, all individuals will act in accord with some agreed ideas of the common good, though I personally find this concept neither realistic nor desirable, in that it denies the fact and value of individual diversity. But not even the most ideal socialist society will obviate the diversity of information about productive methods that must obtain simply because the acquisition of information is costly. Hence, the need for coordination, for some means of seeing that plans of diverse agents have balanced totals, remains. How this coordination takes place has been a central preoccupation of economic theory since Adam Smith and received a reasonably clear answer in the 1870’s with the work of Jevons, Menger, and above all, Leon Walras: it was the fact that all agents in the economy faced the same set of prices that provided the common flow of information needed to coordinate the system. There was, so it was argued, a set of prices, one for each commodity, which would equate supply and demand for all commodities; and if supply and demand were unequal anywhere, at least some prices would change, while none would change in the opposite case. Because of the last characteristics, the balancing of supply and demand under these conditions may be referred to as equilibrium in accordance with the usual use of that term in science and mathematics. The adjective, “general,” refers to the argument that we cannot legitimately speak of equilibrium with respect to any one commodity; since supply and demand on any one market depends on the prices of other commodities, the overall equilibrium of the economy cannot be decomposed into separate equilibria for individual commodities. Now even in the most strictly neoclassical version of price theory, it is not precisely true that prices alone are adequate information to the individual agents for the achievement of equilibrium, a point that will be developed later. One brand of criticism has put more stress on quantities themselves as signals, including no less an authority than the great Keynes (1936); see especially the interpretation of Keynes by Leijonhufvud (1968, especially ch. 2). More recently the same argument has been advanced by Kornai (1971) from socialist experience. Nevertheless, while the criticisms are, in my judgment, not without some validity, they have not given rise to a genuine alternative model of detailed resource allocation. The fundamental question remains, how does an overall total quantity, say demand, as in the Keynesian model, get transformed into a set of signals and incentives for individual sellers? If one shifts perspective from description to design of economies it is not so hard to think of nonprice coordinating mechanisms; we are in fact all familiar with rationing in one form or another. Here, the discussion of coordination shades off in that of efficiency. There has long been a view that the competitive price equilibrium is efficient or optimal in some sense that rationing is not. This sense and the exact statement of the optimality theorem were clarified by Pareto (1909, ch. 6, sections 32-38) and, in the 1930’s by my teacher, Harold Hotelling (1938) and by Abram Bergson (1938). An allocation of resources is Pareto efficient (or Pareto optimal) if there is no other feasible allocation which will make everyone better off (or, as more usually stated, make everyone at least as well off and at least one member better off). Then, by an argument that I shall sketch shortly, it was held that a competitive equilibrium necessarily yielded a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources. It was, of course, recognized, most explicitly perhaps by Bergson, that Pareto efficiency in no way implied distributive justice. An allocation of resources could be efficient in a Pareto sense and yet yield enormous riches to some and dire poverty to others. |