دانلود رایگان ترجمه مقاله چرخش شرکت حسابرسی، تخصص حسابرس و کیفیت حسابرسی – AAAJournals 2015
دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی چرخش شرکت حسابرسی، تخصص حسابرس و کیفیت حسابرسی در زمینه حسابرسی شهری به همراه ترجمه فارسی
عنوان فارسی مقاله: | چرخش شرکت حسابرسی، تخصص حسابرس و کیفیت حسابرسی در زمینه حسابرسی شهری |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: | Audit Firm Rotation, Auditor Specialization, and Audit Quality in the Municipal Audit Context |
رشته های مرتبط: | حسابداری، حسابرسی |
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نشریه | AAAJournals |
کد محصول | f445 |
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بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله: پیشگفتار پیش زمینه و فرضیات کیفیت حسابرسی معمولا به عنوان احتمال کشف و گزارش یک خطا یا حذف توسط یک حسابرس که ممکن است به لحاظ مادی روی صورتهای مالی تاثیر بگذارد، تعریف میشود. کیفیت حسابرسی اغلب به عنوان درجه انطباق حسابرس با استانداردهای حرفهای در انجام یک حسابرسی صورتهای مالی، در نظر گرفته میشود. گزارشهای اخیر PCAOB نشان میدهند که کیفیت حسابرسی، یک دغدغهی همیشگی است زیرا تعداد نقصهای حسابرسی کشف شده در طول برخی از بررسیهای PCAOB در واقع نسبت به دورههای بررسی قبلی افزایش یافته است. این نتایج، در ترکیب با یک مطالعهی PCAOB (2011)، یک مقالهی FRC (2011)، و یک مطالعهی بخش دولتی منتشر شده توسط شورای تمامیت و کارایی رئیس جمهور (PCIE 2007) ایالات متحده، مساله سیاستهای چرخش شرکتهای حسابرسی را به عنوان ابزاری برای بهبود کیفیت حسابرسی، ترفیع میدهند. ما در توسعه فرضیات خود استدلال میکنیم که سیاستهای چرخش شرکتهای حسابرسی میتوانند تاثیر مثبتی روی کیفیت حسابرسی، و همچنین کیفیت شرکت حسابرسی منتخب داشته باشند. در انجام این کار، ما به بررسی تعریف وسیعتری از چرخش شرکتهای حسابرسی، که سازگار با توصیههای سیاست اخیر است، میپردازیم. ما علاوهبراین استدلال میکنیم که کیفیت شرکت حسابرسی دارای تاثیر روی کیفیت حسابرسی است و استفاده از سیاستهای چرخش منجر به قراردادهایی با شرکتهای حسابرسی با کیفیت میشود، که به نوبه خود منجر به حسابرسیهای با کیفیت بالاتر میشود. |
بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی: INTRODUCTION Audit firm rotation has been debated internationally for several decades. It received significant attention in 2011, as evidenced by issuance of a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board concept release (PCAOB 2011), a paper by the U.K. Financial Reporting Council (FRC 2011), and a paper issued by the European Commission (2011). These proposals focused primarily on two types of rotation policies: mandatory rotation and a requirement of periodic auditor assessments or requests for proposal (termed ‘‘retendering’’ in the U.K.) that would force audit committees to consider whether the current audit firm should be retained or replaced. Most recently, in April 2014, the European Parliament approved new preliminary audit regulations requiring most public companies to rotate audit firms every ten years (Tysiac 2014a). Although the U.K. has proposed mandatory retendering of audit engagements, it is reconsidering mandated rotation in light of the European Union regulations (Tysiac 2014b).1 Research directly addressing audit firm rotation is limited, due to the lack of regulatory requirements for rotation policies, combined with the paucity of publicly held organizations voluntarily establishing such a policy.2 As a result, most extant auditor rotation research studies substitute audit firm tenure for rotation, providing only indirect evidence on whether rotation policies influence audit quality proxies. Studies using tenure assume changes in audit firms result from rotation policies; however, audit firm change can be initiated by the audit firm or client for various other reasons, such as the level of audit fees, opinion-shopping, or audit firm portfolio rebalancing based on risk assessments or changes in practice focus. In the government sector it is common for entities to adopt audit firm rotation policies that either mandate rotation of audit firms or require periodic solicitation of bids for audit services to determine whether the current audit firm should be retained or replaced (Wendell, Pearson, and Gregson 1998; Copley and Doucet 1993b; Rubin 1988). A GAO report (U.S. GAO 1987) recommends that governmental entities enter into multi-year contracts with audit firms and establish review or rotation policies for the contract expiration. The report suggests a bidding and evaluation process similar to that discussed in the PCAOB and FRC proposals. Within the State of Florida some, but not all, municipal governments periodically rotate audit firms, either through ordinance or established policies. Research using entities with rotation policies provides a better perspective on the effect of rotation than do studies that use audit firm changes or audit firm tenure as a proxy for rotation. Using a Florida sample, we are able to directly examine the effect of audit firm rotation policies on audit quality to better inform policymakers and other interested parties. We study whether an audit firm rotation policy, specifically a mandatory rotation or a periodic audit firm evaluation requirement, is associated with a higher quality audit, where audit quality refers to the extent to which financial statements comply with professional standards and are not materially misstated due to errors or fraud (U.S. GAO 2003; PCAOB 2011). We find that entities with audit firm rotation policies are associated with higher audit quality; the higher quality appears to be primarily attributable to technical capabilities of the audit firm. In particular, governments with rotation policies select more specialized audit firms, and specialist audit firms are associated with higher quality audits. Although other costs and benefits associated with audit firm rotation should be considered, evidence from the Florida government market suggests that rotation policies positively affect audit quality primarily through audit firm selection. The next section provides background information about audit firm rotation, audit quality, and audit firm specialization, as well as the research hypotheses. The research design is included in the subsequent section, followed by the data analysis and results. Conclusions and policy implications of the study are discussed in the final section. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES Audit quality is commonly defined as the probability that an auditor both discovers and reports an error or omission that could materially affect the financial statements (DeAngelo 1981; PCAOB 2011). Audit quality is often operationalized as the degree of auditor compliance with professional standards in the conduct of a financial statement audit (U.S. GAO 2004; Deis and Giroux 1992). Recent PCAOB reports indicate that audit quality is a continuing concern, since the number of audit deficiencies found during some PCAOB reviews has actually increased relative to prior review periods (Hamilton 2011). These results, in conjunction with a PCAOB study (2011), a FRC paper (2011), and a government sector study released by the U.S. President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE 2007) elevate the issue of audit firm rotation policies as a means to improve audit quality. In developing our hypotheses we argue that audit firm rotation policies can positively affect audit quality, as well as the quality of the audit firm selected. In doing so, we examine a broader definition of audit firm rotation, consistent with recent policy recommendations. We further argue that the quality of the audit firm affects the quality of the audit, and that the use of rotation policies leads to contracts with quality audit firms, which in turn results in higher quality audits. |