دانلود رایگان ترجمه مقاله دستورالعمل جدید OECD برای شرکت های چند ملیتی (نشریه تیلور و فرانسیس 2016)

دستور العمل های OECD جدید برای شرکت های چند ملیتی: بهتر ولی ناکافی

The new OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: better but not enough

Abstract

This viewpoint addresses the extent to which the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises adequately serve as a system of global governance for MNEs. We argue that, while a 2011 revision has strengthened the Guidelines, their somewhat limited scope, voluntary nature, and less than satisfactory implementation render their potential utility unrealised.

1 Introduction

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are profit-generating entities that engage in the production of goods and services in more than one country. In the context of socio-economic development, the process of foreign direct investment (FDI) in which MNEs engage can have both benefits and costs. Therefore, the purpose of governing the behaviour of MNEs would be to enhance the advantages of FDI and, more importantly, to mitigate the disadvantages.1 However, governing institutions of MNEs are much weaker than those in other realms of global economic activity. For example, while the World Trade Organization (WTO) governs international trade and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) governs international finance, no such institutional counterpart exists in the realm of international production.2 This situation leaves a major lacuna in the global governance system that has been partially filled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. This viewpoint addresses the extent to which the OECD Guidelines address this global governance failure. We argue that, while a recent revision has somewhat strengthened the Guidelines, their overall lack of binding power and less than satisfactory implementation render their full utility unrealised.

History and context

Efforts to influence and govern MNE behaviour go back to the late 1960s. For example, in 1969, a panel convened by the United Nations (UN) Secretary General at the direction of the Economic and Social Counsel (ECOSOC) led to the adoption of an ‘‘Agreed Statement’’ that articulated several understandings and forward steps for MNEs to consider. It was agreed both that MNEs need to recognise the development objectives of their host countries and that these objectives were best identified by the host countries themselves rather than by MNEs. While today the latter point might seem obvious, at the time, it was a significant policy step. In the late 1970s, under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), attention turned to the effects of restrictive business practices on the development processes of host countries. This led to a 1980 UN conference on restrictive business practices and an associated ‘‘Set of Principles and Rules’’. 3 At the time, an issue of debate was whether to make the guidelines mandatory or voluntary. Ultimately, it was decided that they were to be considered recommendations for national law rather than mandatory rules to be adjudicated by an international body (Benson 1980–81), a decision that was to carry over into the OECD Guidelines.

Another panel was appointed by the UN Secretary General in 1972 in response to the perceived MNE influence on host-country policies. Based on the panel’s findings, the UN Secretariat prepared a report that identified many host-country concerns and concluded that a comprehensive Code of Conduct on MNEs should be prepared.4 This process resulted in the establishment of the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations and the United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations. These entities initiated the negotiation of a multilateral Code of Conduct for MNEs. This Code laid out a number of responsibilities that pertained to the legal purview of states to monitor and regulate MNE activities, the alignment of MNE activities to development goals, MNE non-intervention in the political affairs of the country, MNE respect for cultural practices and traditions in host countries, and identifying the reporting requirements of MNEs. The Code also included anti-corruption provisions from the previously described agreement on restrictive business practices. However, there was disagreement regarding the issue of technology transfer, the nationalisation of foreign assets, and whether state-owned enterprises should be treated as MNEs. Once again, an issue of conflict was whether the Code should be mandatory or voluntary. Despite some significant effort to craft the Code and despite some success in reaching agreement, the tenor of meetings became contentious and work on the Code was abandoned.

Moving forward in time, most of the existing frameworks on standards with regard to FDI address host-country polices and are geared towards protecting investors and ensuring limited interference. These standards are often codified into bilateral investment treaties (BITs), defined by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as ‘‘agreements between two countries for the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each other’s territories by companies based in either country’’. 6 BITs have grown rapidly over time, from approximately 400 in 1990 to nearly 3,000 currently (UNCTAD 2015). As noted by Anderson (2009–10), ‘‘the substance of post-World War II bilateral investment treaties has not changed substantially over time, and they still omit many rights of and protections for individuals and communities in host countries’’ (13). This focus on BITs rather than more multinational approaches to MNE governance is a significant shortcoming of current institutional arrangements to govern MNEs.