دانلود مقاله ترجمه شده مسئولیت جوابگویی به عنوان یک تناقض، مدرک و موهبت – مجله الزویر

فهرست مطالب:

 چکیده
۱ مقدمه
۲ پاسحگویی و مسئولیت
۳ تناقض پاسخگویی
۴ پاسخ کویی و افزایش سطوح مئولیت در قبال سایرین
۴ ۱ دیدگاه های لویناسی در خصوص پاسخگوییِ:اظهار و نقد
۴ ۲ شخص ثالث و گذار به کلیات اخلاقی
۴ ۳ ساختار زدایی اخلاقی
۵ دیدگاه دریدان در رابطه با افزایش پاسخگویی و مسئولیت در قبال سایرین: شهادت و هدیه
۵ ۱ پاسخگویی به عنوان شهادت
۵ ۲ پاسخ گویی به عنوان هدیه

بخشی از ترجمه:

به عنوان یک فرد قابل شناسایی و دارای اختیار کسی که می نویسد و نوشته های او هرگز چیزی را بدون محاسبه و یا بدون ضمیر ناخود اگاه و یا تبادل و یا بازگشت و یا سود ناشی از ان ارائه نمی دهد و بر اساس تعریف این یعنی مصادره کردن ارزش مازاد و یا در یک زمینه ی سرمایه گذاری خاص. می توان گفت که این یک تعریف بسیار مبهم و در عین حال مشخص از فرد است .کسی نمی تواند فرد را به جز فرد اب این دیدگاه سرمایه طلبانه تفکیک کند(Derrida, 1991a, p. 101).
هدیه یک واکنش یا پاسخ مثبت به دیگری، یک بله برای آمدن دیگری، یک پاسخ به فردیت و یا الوهیت ذات نامحدود است. هدیه و فردیت تقاضای مشتری مابانه در چارچوب افق های انتظارات ما، وظایف ما، سنت ما، قانون ما، برنامه های ما نگنجیده و به عنوان یک سورپرایز کامل تلقی می شود. هدیه نمی تواند موضوع وظیفه اخلاقی یا قانونی باشد بلکه موضوع مسئولیت پذیری، یا وظیفه فراتر از وظیفه( دریدا ۱۹۹۱ الف، صفحه ۱۵۶) است. آن همان مسئولیت ما برای پاسخ به تقاضای مطلق دیگری است( ۱۹۹۱ الف، صفحه ۱۳۷) بدون حسابگری بدون محاسبه سود)، بدون دلیل( بدون پرسیدن چرا)، بدون اندازه گیری و پس انداز است. هدیه چرخه متوالی را که در آن هیچ اتفاقی نمی افتد را نقض می کند. با هدیه، زمان از هم گسسته شده و موجب نقض علیت، تعهد و مسئولیت پذیری شده و نظم و قاعده هدیه در برابر آینده مطلقی که بهتر از حال نیست را مختل ساخته و موجب ناممکن شدن یا غیر محتمل شدن فرایند ابتکار می شود. مفهوم مسئولیت فراتر از وظیفه از نظر دریدا ما را به سمت فراتر از لویناس و فراتر از تعهد سوق می دهد(گ.پتا ۱۹۹۷، الف، صفحه ۲۲۶) و هم چنین ما را به سمت تسلیم شدن به دیگران و تسلیم شدن به غیر ممکن سوق می دهد. دریدا بیان می کند که تسلیم از نظر ما عشق به خود است(دریدا ۱۹۹۳، صفحه ۷۴).

بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:

The aporia of accountability can be understood in terms of a conflict between the singularity of moral responsibility, secured by secrecy, and the generality of ethics. The processes of accountability draw us into the ethical, into explaining and justifying to the community, and thereby it threatens to undo the singularity that is crucial to moral responsibility: “far from ensuring responsibility, the generality of ethics incites us to irresponsibility. It impels me to speak, to reply, to account for something, and thus to dissolve my singularity in the medium of the concept” (Derrida, 1992, p. 61). In the accounting literature, and even in work that engages with the pre-social dimensions of accountability, there is only limited appreciation ofthe significance ofthis conflict. Shearer (2002) perhaps comes closestto recognizing the problem. However,the Levinasian perspective she employs, does not encourage or support its clear formulation, and the prescriptions she offers are, it seems to us, consequentially limited. In the fourth section of the paper we begin to critically explore the potential of accountability to enhance levels of responsibility for the other. We begin by considering and critically commenting on Levinasian perspectives on the issue and related suggestions. We focus especially on assumptions and suggestions in Shearer’s paper (2002). We use our discussion of Shearer’s paper as a vehicle for the clarification and development of our own thinking concerning accountability. Shearer’s paper applies a conception of responsibility drawn from the work of Emmanuel Levinas to corporate accountability. She argues that there is a need to infuse corporate responsibility with the singularity of moral responsibility. Our main criticism of Shearer’s analysis is that she ultimately fails to recognize the aporia of accountability and the danger that accountability presents for responsibility. This weakness, as we see it, is inherited from Levinas, and originates in his reluctance to acknowledge the ultimate irreconcilability of absolute and singular responsibilities to other (moral responsibilities) and general responsibilities to other others, to third parties, and to the community (ethical responsibilities). The distinction between singular and general responsibilities is important to this paper. We will generally use the term “ethical” to refer to responsibilities arising at the universal or general, and intelligible level, of rules, codes, and social norms. We will normally use the term “moral” to refer responsibilities arising at the level of the individual, responsibilities borne by one subject for another, that is, singular responsibilities that will typically not be intelligible in social terms.1 A crucial concern of this paper will be to explore the implications for accountability of the relationship between singular and general, moral and ethical, responsibilities, and in particular the possibility that the ethical, and the accountability that goes with it, can become a threatto the moral.2 We extend our exploration ofthis issue in latter parts ofthe fourth section ofthe paper. The analysis here revolves around the contrasting reactions that Derrida and Levinas have to biblical story of Abraham’s binding of Isaac (Genesis: 22). In Derrida’s analysis, the distinctions between moral and ethical responsibility tend to break down. That deconstruction leaves us, however, with the essential difficulty of reconciling one’s absolute and singular responsibility to the other with one’s singular responsibilities to other others. It leaves us facing a radical undecidability. In the final part of the paper we develop consideration of how we might best respond to the aporias of responsibility and accountability, and how through accountability, levels of responsibility for the other might be raised.We develop our analysis in this section, in two parts, through a consideration of Derrida’s analysis of testimony and of the gift. Our use of the notion of accountability as testimony takes its lead from Kamuf (2007), and relies essentially on the fact that testimony always opens a relation with the other in a way that calculative forms of accountability do not. The gift represents a response to the other that goes beyond Levinasian obligation. The gift thus opens a space for responsibility and accountability beyond obligation. In that space, or time, of the gift, we argue, ways may be opened, found, for sustaining the pursuit of accountability despite the final indissolubility of the aporias. Derrida grapples with the aporia of the gift, that is, the fact that the conditions of possibility of the gift are also its conditions of impossibility. The implication he draws from the impossibility of the gift is not that we should abandon the notion. On the contrary, he suggests the very impossibility of the gift may impassion our pursuit of it. We apply the same line of thinking to accountability. The aporia of accountability must not lead us to relinquish the notion of accountability. But it does bring clearly into focus the scale of the challenge faced. We must, somehow negotiate a path between contradictory, irreconcilable, and incommensurable responsibilities and accountabilities. Somehow we must allow the accounts given by our corporations to exceed the cycle of debt and credit. The account as impossible gift must give more than is owed. The measure of accountability given must exceed that owed.