

ideologies of sexual inequality and strategies for change in male-female relations

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Over the past several years, anthropologists have increasingly examined systems of male dominance and female subordination. The dynamic effects of what might be called sexual ideology—societal beliefs about maleness and femaleness—in these societies remain, however, largely unexplored and little understood. How does each sex perceive itself and the other sex in systems that are characterized by sexual inequality? To what degree do women reject the meaning systems that are held by the dominant sex? And given the fact that sociopolitical action generally has ideological underpinnings, what potentialities do women's ideologies provide for stimulating change in systems that are characterized by women's subordination?

The importance of ideology in promoting or hindering change at the sociopolitical level has been posited by many prominent social and political theorists (Marx and Engels 1972; Lukacs 1968; Sartre 1960). By providing its adherents with a radical perspective on existing social conditions, for example, a potent ideology can encourage shifts in consciousness, shifts that can lead a subjugated group to protest its own subjugation. Alternatively, a well-formulated ideology of dominance can rationalize the existence of a system of differential rights and privileges, making that system appear closed to the possibility of revolution or reform. As Althusser has suggested with respect to the latter cases, we must understand the structure and functioning of such ideological apparatuses in order to comprehend how systems of domination are perpetuated from generation to generation (Althusser 1971:133). We must also understand these structures in order to determine a system's openness to change.

This paper is concerned with the ideological underpinnings of systems of sexual inequality and with the sociopolitical alternatives associated with their occurrence. It focuses upon the role of sexual ideology in the forging of female consciousness, in the promoting of female solidarity, and in the generating of change in male-female relations. Its subject is one that has been examined only infrequently to date (Sutton et al. 1975; Murphy and Murphy 1974; Bamberger 1974; and Heilbrun 1973 are exceptions) and is one still manifesting numerous insufficiencies at the levels of theory and data collection.

An identity of beliefs about maleness and femaleness among the males and females of any society has generally been presumed. This paper examines the sexual ideologies of societies characterized by sexual inequality in terms of divergences between male and female beliefs and in terms of potentials for political change. Four sorts of sexual ideologies are put forward as ideal types. Differences in patterns of protest and change are examined as they correlate with these types.

These insufficiencies have taken several forms. The interrelationship of ideology and social inequality has been most thoroughly explicated for capitalist and imperialist systems, whereas the analysis of sexually inegalitarian systems in these terms largely awaits scholarly attention. The proper analysis of such systems additionally awaits the development of a thorough and sensitive mode of ethnographic description. Anthropologists particularly have tended to haphazardly summarize other societies' beliefs and attitudes about men and women, when these beliefs have been recorded at all. In most of these cases, a homogeneity of belief among men and women and among other subgroups has all too often been assumed.

These insufficiencies have had several untoward effects from the standpoint of political analysis. The homogeneity presumption has not only caused the content of many sexual ideologies to be misrepresented; it has also made the mapping of behavioral linkages difficult. If an ideology validates inequality in the eyes of its believers, and if variants from that ideology serve as indicators of discontent among certain segments of the populace as well as potential stimuli for protest and change, then the anthropologist unwittingly filters out possible social change factors when he or she neglects the element of variability.

In order to gauge these potentialities, the thoughtful anthropologist does well to consider male and female views of maleness and femaleness as separate and possibly conflicting entities. Such a distinction might lead to generalized insights about the structure of sexual ideologies and might additionally lead to a regrouping of sexual ideologies in more meaningful political terms. In particular, the occurrence of similarities and differences between men's and women's beliefs can be used as a basis for differentiating sexual ideological systems. The following fourfold schema provides a preliminary formulation in these terms:

- (1) Men's and women's beliefs about maleness and femaleness approximate one another.
- (2) Men's and women's beliefs about maleness approximate one another, while their beliefs about femaleness are markedly different.
- (3) Men's and women's beliefs about femaleness approximate one another, while their beliefs about maleness are markedly different.
- (4) Men's and women's beliefs about both maleness and femaleness are markedly different.

The similarities and differences that occur between men's and women's belief systems can, of course, pertain to any of a number of contents. One that has a direct impact upon the politics of male dominance and female subordination concerns how the two sexes are morally evaluated according to men's and women's stereotypes: the degree to which men and women are viewed as able and likely to exhibit those qualities that are deemed laudable for humankind at large and for his or her own sex. The data that will be analyzed here indicate that men's and women's expectations concerning the two sexes' potentialities and the probability of their actualizations can converge or diverge along any of the lines proposed in the preceding schema. The following derivative typology, which addresses the potentiality-actualization issue, thus can usefully be formulated in its terms:

- Type 1: men and women both tend to see men as capable and responsible while both tend to see women as less so.
- Type 2: men and women both tend to see men as capable and responsible while women alone tend to see women as having comparable capabilities.
- Type 3: men and women tend to agree that the capability and responsibility of women is in doubt, but only men tend to see men as providing a positive alternative.

Type 4: men tend to see men as capable and responsible while seeing women as less so. Women, by contrast, tend to see women as the more capable and responsible sex.

Sexual ideologies that tend toward any of these four ideal types merit attention. Perhaps most interesting however—because they have been least examined, because they are highly complex internally, and because they exhibit their own characteristic potentialities for promoting sociopolitical change—are ideologies that tend toward ideal types 2, 3, and 4. Broadly, men's and women's valuations of the sexes stand in partial or total inversion to one another in these ideological systems. As such, they mix a message of sexual inequality with a message of sexual equality (types 2 and 3) or imply sexual inequality of a reversed sort (type 4). Interestingly, they do this while supporting systems of female subordination.

This paper examines the structure and functioning of various ideologies of sexual inequality by contrasting particular ideologies that exhibit valuations that are broadly of the four ideal type patterns. It particularly focuses upon one system that approximates ideal type 3, the belief system that occurs among one Arab-Berber population in the South of Morocco. In that belief system, inversions of type 3 tend to occur with regard to how (1) sexual, (2) parent-child, and (3) other male-female interactions are interpreted and portrayed. When considered as part of a larger sociopolitical system, the Moroccan material points up the impact that such an ideology can have upon male-female relations in a society characterized by the marked subordination of women.

The Moroccan descriptions that follow contrast men's and women's assessments of the sexes as these are put forward in various kinds of social discourse: conversation, proverbs, aphorisms, and solicited accounts. The beliefs contained within them are found among the more than twenty thousand inhabitants of the region that comprises the city of Taroudant and its immediate environs. Interestingly, for each of the two sexes in that region, a relative uniformity of beliefs regarding maleness and femaleness is to be found, a uniformity that spans differing age groups (adolescent to aged), economic standing (poor to rich), and geographical background (predominantly mountain, plains, and city). The occurrence of these uniformities probably reflects the fact that local residents, who continue to specialize in artisanry, agriculture, and animal husbandry, generally remain sheltered from the direct influence of the French, Morocco's onetime colonizers, and other Europeans. In turn, given this history, these uniformities are likely to have a broader significance: these regional representations probably contain beliefs that extend back into Morocco's past for many of its subpopulations.

Type 2 and type 4 systems will be considered and compared after the Moroccan type 3 system is reviewed.

the Moroccan ideology of maleness and femaleness: male-female variations

What are believed to be differences in male and female sexuality are ultimately explained in Moroccan society in terms of differences in physiological development. Female sexuality is believed to change as female structure and functioning change, particularly through the experience of defloration. Defloration is felt to awaken sexuality, turning women into creatures with uncontrolled passions for sex. Conversely, male sexuality is viewed as restrainable by thought and volition. Although men are felt to be all too frequently motivated by baser sexual desires, they are credited with greater potential for overcoming these tendencies. According to the schema, this can be understood biologically: there is no irreversible, developmental benchmark akin to defloration for the male sex.

views about adult sexuality Moroccan men ascribe an image of uncontrolled passion to their adult women. Women are called "cows" because of their putative animality. They are said to share their brains with donkeys, a reference not only to the donkey's stupidity but also to the female's interest in the male animal's marked genital endowment. Indeed, the female of whatever species is represented as animal in terms of her insatiable desire for penetration. Although the farmer might tire, states one metaphor, the land awaits the plow with undiminished eagerness.

The stereotype of uncontrolled female passion is not held by men alone. It is also utilized by women in characterizing women. The sexual foibles of women are graphically portrayed in folktales told by women to women and are eagerly discussed by women as they evaluate the behavior of their own sex. Most women are like baskets, said one mother-in-law with reference to her daughter-in-law's unflagging sexual interest: throughout their lives they rest rooted upon their bases, that is, upon the seats of their animality.

While characterizing other women in terms of heightened passion, women typically tend to be more charitable in their self-characterizations. With regard to their own sexuality, most women say that they can control and channel their sexual impulses. Even in their own cases, however, they do not generally challenge the more fundamental belief about excessive female passion. Rather, self-control is emphasized as the element that holds a powerful sexuality in check.

Because women, like men, subscribe to the image of raging female passion, men's and women's conceptions of female sexuality do not differ perceptibly with regard to this most basic element. Rather, differences in sexual ideology become evident when the two sexes enumerate and describe the attributes of maleness. For their part, men tend to see satiability as a basic element in their own sexual interactions. "What gets tired, the tunnel or the rat?" "What runs dry, the river or its bed?" Such aphorisms, typically recounted by men, are replete with the imagery of women's uncontrollable passion while also conveying an image of greater restraint for the male sex.

Women, by contrast, do not typically allude to this attribute of balance when describing male behavior. Instead they view men as possessing their own quotient of insatiability and waywardness. "A man is like the hands of a clock, he points in all directions." "He is like the *oued* [river], he cuts his bed in one place one year and in another the next." For women, there is little nobility, balance, or logic impelling men's sexual nature. If women are animal and so must be denigrated, men also are animal and so merit condemnation, although it must be expressed with guardedness (Vinogradov 1974:196).

The difference between the two sexes' images of maleness and femaleness is apparent in their opposing representations of the two core concepts in Moroccan sexual ideology: *'aqel* and *nifs*. Men expound the view that they especially have or can develop more *'aqel* (intelligence, responsibility, rationality) while women have more *nifs* (flesh, spirit, breath, or more generally flesh-centered desires and tensions). Derogatory and rather obscene in its usage, the form *nifs* is sometimes employed by men with reference to their own baser instincts but is more generally used to portray the propensities of women. Although less frequently utilized by women, women do occasionally employ the concept in a similar manner in characterizing other women's sexuality. Hence they again promote an image of women that focuses upon animal characteristics. As importantly, however, women also extend the notion of *nifs* to their characterizations of men. "They [men] say that we have more *nifs* [than men do]," is a frequent female response to the question of whether women really have more *nifs* and less *'aqel*. Women then generally proceed to express doubts, however, about the lesser animality of men. Interestingly, *nifs* was interpreted by one female informant as emotionality in the sense of sensitivity of soul, especially as it concerns interpersonal relations at the level of the nuclear family. Having defined it in that way, she readily agreed that women have more of it.

At issue, then, is not the fact that women are passionate and animalistic, a fact of life with which women heartily agree, but rather the assertion that men are less so than women. Men, in women's eyes, can be consumed with desire of a sexual sort, and can be shamefully profligate, quite like the female sex according to the male view.

As might be expected, of course, women's somewhat distinctive views are not aired generally—before men, women, and outsiders—to the same degree as are men's notions of maleness and femaleness. In keeping with their more precarious position in Moroccan society, women are guarded in expressing their attitudes before mixed audiences and generally limit their pronouncements about men to exchanges with persons of their own sex. On these all-female occasions, however, women often emphasize the lowered male image. They often call male sexuality and intelligence into question and laugh together at men who run after women and so show their foolishness. Indeed, while women often point to women's animality before other women through comments like "women's minds are in their vulvas," they as often extend the allusion to men by asserting that "men's minds are in their penises."

Given the derogatory image that women put forth about men, it is not surprising that modesty (*hishma*) is not the only female quality that is lauded by women. Almost as important in women's eyes is patience (*sber*). Indeed while men and women alike heavily stress modesty in evaluating women's behavior, women also stress patience as a female behavioral ideal. Again, these different emphases—of modesty by men and of modesty and patience by women—get to the heart of differing male and female attitudes about the two sexes: while both sexes stress female frailties and so seek to counteract them through regulations concerning modesty, women also recognize the existence of male frailties and so steel themselves against these disruptive influences through an emphasis upon patience.

Despite women's rather cynical view of male fidelity, disgrace still falls upon women and not men for engaging in sexually illicit liaisons. This moral assessment is accepted by men and women alike. No matter how demanding the man is, the woman must stand firm against him or, by submitting, must ultimately pay the social price. Ironically, this view is especially tenacious, for both men's and women's ideologies validate its assertions. The condemnation of such women is in accord with the male view of femaleness, for according to that view, women take on the role of temptress and are considered more profligate. This view is also in accordance with women's perspective: precisely because women know men to be wayward and dissolute, women show little tolerance for women's assertions that men have seduced them. Ignorance or innocence provide no viable excuses for why girls or women submit to premarital or extramarital sex.

views about parenthood Closely tied to notions about sexuality are notions about parenthood in the Moroccan ideological schema, for both sexuality and parenthood are perceived in terms of related physiological propensities. Both are also evaluated in terms of their emotional and behavioral effects. In both of these senses, parenthood and sexuality are seen as potentially competitive. While rising from the same instinctual wellspring, both require that choices be made concerning human priorities. Both require an outlay of passion as well as of thought, emotion, and attention. Given the limited-good nature of these qualities in the Moroccan scheme of things, parenthood and sexuality can easily come to be at odds.

Given the views of male and female sexuality that men and women hold, men's and women's portrayals of fathers and mothers emerge logically. Believed to be strongly sexually motivated, women are seen by men as capable of sacrificing their children for sex. Men, by contrast, view themselves as providing a measure of rationality in parent-child relations, a rationality that is consistent with the male self-image of sexual balance. Women, by contrast, see men as being sharply limited in their parental feelings and loyal-

ties, for they see men's innate sexual tendencies as competing with their paternal tendencies. In keeping with women's somewhat negative self-image, however, they also recognize the possibility of their own parental weakness.

The correspondence of the sexual and parental images remains incomplete, it must be stressed, because of women's maternal stereotype. Whereas women's belief in their own powerful sexuality might imply a negative valuation of their maternal tendencies, maternity, in fact, generally carries a strong positive valuation among Moroccan women. Women definitely view themselves as the caring ones in situations of child rearing. And yet—and quite as importantly, I would argue—that positive image also remains incomplete: a belief in a mother's potential treachery continues to exist.

The tension that is perceived to exist between sexuality and parenthood finds special expression in the Moroccan legal system, where it forms an ideological basis for limitations upon women's rights and privileges. Mothers are felt to be physiologically appropriate as rearers of their children, and so guardianship is normally accorded to them or to other female relatives in the event of a couple's divorce. Those same mothers, however, are viewed as fit for the mother role only when they restrict their sexual desires by eschewing outside sexual involvements and by rejecting subsequent marriages. When sexuality is actualized, it is felt inevitably to work to parenthood's loss. Mothers thus lose their guardianship at the time of their remarriage, according to statute. Through a desire to please a new husband and through a need for sexual favors, it is felt that a woman will slight even her own daughter or son.

As an ideological document that is totally the creation of men, the Moroccan law code understandably reflects men's attitudes about sexuality and parenthood. It is thus not surprising that the code reflects basic male notions about a mother's potential treachery. It is also not surprising that the law code is more generous in its treatment of men. The father who has guardianship over his children and then remarries, for example, retains control over his children. While female sexuality and maternity work at cross-purposes according to the male perspective, fatherhood and male sexuality are felt not necessarily to conflict.

If men's perceptions are institutionalized in the Moroccan law code, women's perceptions are institutionalized in what women believe the law code contains. These beliefs are significant in the sense that women gear their lives to them, unaware that their beliefs often do not accord with statute. Thus, women often state that women will remain sexually controlled when in the presence of children. As such, they often believe that the presence of a child provides them with legally recognized protection for their reputations when they are otherwise alone. When women are so accompanied, they thus feel that husbands have no moral or legal right to divorce them for dalliance.

From the ideological vantage, these beliefs about divorce are in keeping with women's perceptions about sexuality and parenthood. The belief in the existence of such legal protections hinges upon women's pride in the strength of their maternal feelings. Few women, say women, would commit immoralities in the presence of their children. This feeling is so strong, say women, that the psychological prohibition generally holds even if the child is not yet aware—if it is still a babe in arms.

The same folk legal beliefs, however, also allow for the possibility of mother's betrayal and so are not totally laudatory of women. From women's commentary, for example, it is clear that the maternal instinct is accorded priority over sexual desire when the two are placed in direct confrontation. When a direct confrontation of stimuli is lacking, however, women are felt to be capable of neglecting their children, of leaving them untended in order to engage in extramarital sex.

The female view of maternal loyalty, then, is conditional whereas the male view involves unconditional distrust. In a like sense, however, while men see their paternal impulses in a

generally positive light, women tend to view them with extreme skepticism. Women say that their own *kibda* ("liver," or "heart" in our sense) is given over to children while men's *kibda* is devoted to business and other women. From the female viewpoint, paternity plays only a minor role in male motivation, and male sexuality is thus seen inevitably to win out in the battle of parenthood and sex. This result is felt to be understandable in the light of physiological and social realities. Women argue that a woman carries her child during pregnancy, then she carries it on her back for several years, finally she raises it. How can a father equal the closeness that such continued contact effects?

views about extra-familial interactions In the wider world beyond the family, as in the Moroccan family itself, the worth of men and women tends to be evaluated by Moroccans according to interactive criteria. One is seduced by or is faithful to; one is modest before or is brazen toward; one betrays or protects. A woman or man is evaluated according to the nature of such interactions. As such, character does not emerge superordinately as a conglomerate of internal tendencies and feelings that sometimes reach external expression, as Americans, for example, are sometimes wont to conceptualize it; instead, character exists to the extent to which it is interactively expressed.

It is thus not unexpected that male and female character, which are conceptualized as different in the Moroccan schema, are also conceived of as being expressed differently at the generalized interactive level; and that the two sexes, which hold differing views about male and female propensities at the sexual and parental levels, should also hold differing beliefs about the emotional bases for different male and female styles of interaction. From the male point of view, this difference in male and female styles revolves around the progressive development of female stubbornness and egotism, a developmental tendency that men are not felt to share. From the female point of view, the differences between male and female styles is diminished: women are felt to develop an exaggerated stubbornness, but men are also felt to display a considerable contentiousness and self-centeredness.

This negative interactive complex, which is particularly associated with women, can be subsumed under the cover term of *dla' 'awja* ("twisted breast" or "chest"). The term refers to a general inability to make peace or compromise. If women fight, it is said, they will always continue fighting and will never again come together in friendship. Moreover, if an opinion is formed by them, whether out of love or in enmity, they will be subsequently closed minded to others' opinions and views. Women are felt to be prisoners of their hatreds, perpetuating them, even when propriety, loyalty, and good sense demand conciliativeness.

Dla' 'awja rears its ugly head in family as well as in nonfamily matters. The following cases, provided by Moroccans, are illustrative of its form and effects:

- (1) The old Berber woman Yemena always begged for money although her son, with whom she lived, had sufficient income to support her. Moreover, she tucked away her earnings instead of sharing them with her son. Upon her death a 100,000 *ryal* note (\$1000) was said to have been found hidden among her possessions. Yemena was said to have *dla' 'awja* not so much because she took from outsiders under false pretenses but because of the effect that her begging had upon her son. He knew of her dissimulation and yet found that he could not berate his mother. He thus was forced to endure shame until and after her death.
- (2) Taja, a mother of two middle-aged sons who worked their mother's land, had provided herself with a substantial income through personal supervision of her olive groves. With her income she should have helped her sons find brides, and yet she did not. Instead she constantly refused to help them marry, desiring their loyalty for herself alone. As a result of her self-centeredness, she fought with her sons almost continuously. Taja was said by her neighbors to have *dla' 'awja* in her family relations.
- (3) The old woman Ftoma was said to have *dla' 'awja* because of the tensions she caused in the neighborhood. She fought constantly with the other women over what she inter-

puted as discourtesies to her. Although her husband attempted to get her to forget and forgive (for her actions affected his own neighborhood relations), she seldom made peace.

Dla' 'awja corresponds to a pettiness that disrupts socially by nullifying existing rights and obligations. It especially refers to discord that is created in ongoing relationships. Neighborhood, affinal, and parent-child relations are particularly prone to be affected by *dla' 'awja* on the part of older women. With respect to newly married women, who are still young and who therefore are believed not to exhibit the tendency so markedly, the relationship between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law particularly is felt to reveal its disruptive effects.

Corresponding to the belief that the negative power of *dla' 'awja* is operative in women is the belief that a more comprehensive positive virtue is lacking among them, that of *niya* (interest in others, willingness to please). Unlike *dla' 'awja*, *niya* is especially manifested through the performance of voluntaristic behavior of a positive sort rather than through the fulfillment of obligations. Lacking *niya* in sufficient measure, women are believed to *shiyiyik* or be *shiki*: that is, to act overbearingly and preciously when others might merit attention or aid. Women who *shiyiyik*, for example, tend not to talk to others in order to emphasize their exclusiveness; they eat meagerly at celebrations, implying the superiority of their daily food; they do not fix tea for their fellow guests, implying that others should serve them instead.

Both sexes tend to agree that *dla' 'awja* and *shiki* are particularly found in women, and in older women in greatest measure, while *niya* is particularly lacking among them. Women, however, more often cite variations in individual behavior when ascribing these characteristics and often exclude themselves from their generalizations. Furthermore, they frequently cast aspersions upon the superiority that men feel they hold in interpersonal affairs.

The situation most often cited by men in order to demonstrate their lesser susceptibility to *dla' 'awja* is the marketplace transaction. Men will argue with one another, they say, and then fix upon a price with a smile. Similarly, partners and co-workers might dispute deeply during the course of a day but then will patch up their differences, realizing that continued enmity would be detrimental to each party's business affairs. The marketplace necessitates rationality, and men style themselves as kings within the economic and logical realms.

Women, however, regard men's emphasis upon marketplace behavior as narrow and unrevealing. They themselves, say women, are equally reasonable in marketplace transactions. Rather, women's perversity and stubbornness are found largely in the sphere of personalized relationships. But then men, say women, can also show a similar perversity in that context. Often they also cannot forgive and forget. Indeed, the numerous cases in which men abandon their families or are unfaithful to their wives demonstrate the fickleness and vengefulness that men can exhibit. Moreover, the many cases in which men violate what women believe to be their innate legal rights provide yet other examples, in women's view, of men's unsatisfactory behavior in intimate interpersonal relationships.

political activism and Moroccan sexual ideology

To what extent have these divergences in belief encouraged protest among Moroccan women, and to what extent have they provided impetuses for change in the nature of male-female relations? Whereas the data relating to these issues might at first seem straightforward and unambiguous—no protest of an organized or overt kind has occurred among women in Southern Morocco—the issue, in fact, is far more complex, for protest of a more covert, more personalized kind does, in fact, take place. It manifests itself not in the form

of revolutionary action or reform movements, however, but rather through discrete and carefully veiled acts of rebellion.

Some of this rebellious behavior concerns sorcery of a type that women would call morally positive. Wives frequently work sorcery upon their husbands, for these women regard men's loyalties as ever uncertain. Thus, virtually all Southern Moroccan women burn herbs and spices in order to give their husbands a pleasant disposition and in order to restrict their husbands' sexual interest to their marital relationship. In women's eyes, sorcery thus becomes a positively valued means by which husbands can be rendered faithful to their wives. Interestingly, the belief that men are prone to straying sexually is so widespread that the protection of marriage by this means sometimes brings together mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, who are culturally stereotyped as enemies. Mothers-in-law sometimes teach their sons' brides sorcery techniques or permit the use of sorcery without scolding. These women believe that daughters-in-law's sorcery, when of this positive kind, strengthens the unions that mothers-in-law initially brought about through their choices of brides.

A second set of rebellious acts concerns petty theft by wives. Virtually all married women pilfer money or goods in the urban areas in Southern Morocco. Small change is taken from a husband's pockets and/or limited amounts of oil or grain are sometimes taken from a husband's storehouse. The money then is hidden underground or in kitchen utensils while the produce is typically sold by neighborhood women in private transactions or in the local marketplace. Again, this behavior, which men vehemently condemn and strongly punish, is considered appropriate and logical by women; women feel that those valuables give women a measure of security as well as means for fulfilling future material desires. Moreover, these protections, it is felt, must be kept available, for life with men, however content and giving those men might be at the moment, is deemed ever unsure.

A third sphere of veiled rebellion centers upon those messages that are inculcated during child rearing. Mothers believe that their husbands can easily be overcome by their sexual desires and/or by other nonmarital interests (for example, business, male friendships). As a means of imparting wariness to their children, mothers tend to spread the message of father's fickleness within the family, unbeknown to men. Again, women feel that such behavior is merited and might be essential to their children's survival.

All of these acts of rebellion are predicated upon the image of male fickleness that the female ideology provides. From a woman's perspective, these acts are logical responses to the inadequacies of males. As such, women have established several spheres of protest and subversion that men self-righteously oppose but that women also imbue with an aura of righteousness.

From a practical viewpoint, these acts of rebellion constitute viable courses of action for women because the separation of the sexes provides women's activities with considerable camouflage and shelter. Men are frequently separated from women in many contexts and during many activities and therefore can supervise and regulate their women only with a certain difficulty. While other women often take on the role of supervisor in the absence of men, such women frequently show sympathy and understanding for women's problems and so sometimes provide women with greater freedom in their daily affairs.

In keeping with the differences between men's and women's sexual ideologies, the two sexes rationalize the phenomenon of sex segregation, which provides the context for women's subversive acts, quite differently. Men, for example, state that women should be kept separate, for they deem women to be inferior beings. At the same time, they assert that men should spend time with other men, for men necessarily provide each other with a social nexus of an appropriate, positive sort. Respectable men thus state an active preference for men's company in all but sexual affairs. They also tend to view the man who stays

unduly in his house as a fool, an effeminate male, or a laggard. Women, by contrast, frame their rationalizations of sex segregation differently. On the one hand, they see women's potential waywardness as necessitating restraint. On the other hand, they support men's avoidance of women, on whatever bases, because it moves men out of the home. The assumption of male superiority that men espouse, however, is not believed by them. Instead, women encourage men to stay out of women's daily life space in order to afford themselves a better opportunity for independence and covert defiance in family affairs.

Women thus use men's belief in male superiority to their own advantage while also maintaining their skepticism of it. Their critical attitude, however, focuses almost exclusively upon the positive image that men hold of men. The negative image of women that is held by the population at large continues to exist largely unchallenged. This is particularly evident in women's responses to one kind of political interchange: the course of events in most courtroom affairs. Women's life alternatives are sharply circumscribed according to the Moroccan law code as well as according to local customary law. Men, for example, can divorce virtually at whim; women must obtain divorce decrees indirectly and then can obtain them only on a few valid grounds and only with considerable difficulty. In a like manner, men enjoy a freedom of movement that is almost total while women can be legally restricted to their houses by husbandly or fatherly whim. In effect, the social, sexual, and geographical maneuverability of women is by law narrowly restrictable according to the wishes of the male head of any woman's household. And yet women typically express dissatisfaction with only certain aspects of this social reality. Women's objections tend to focus upon the excessive privileges that men hold, rather than upon the heavy restrictions with which women are burdened.

Skepticism about male superiority thus leads Moroccan women to respond with defiance and anger to the privileges that men enjoy. A rather negative self-image, however, prevents these same women from requesting equivalent privileges and rights. As a consequence, no agitation for change in women's status has occurred or is occurring among women in Southern Morocco. Instead and tellingly, women sometimes supervise women most carefully and frequently provide the most scathing critiques of women's behavior. Their responses to women often mix sympathy for women's difficult interpersonal predicaments with an ultimate harshness that accords with a more negative image of self.

ideologies of sexual inequality and potentials for change: a comparison

Moroccan sexual ideology provides one vantage point from which to understand Moroccan sexual politics. Other kinds of ideologies of sexual inequality tend to affect sexual politics in somewhat different ways. I now briefly examine the implications of those ideologies that approximate ideal types, 1, 2, and 4 and also make reference to associated political patternings.

The structural inverse of the ideal type system of which Moroccan sexual ideology is representative is ideal type 2: an ideological system in which women continue to accept the wider culture's validation of men and men's activities with relatively few reservations, while providing themselves with a similar positive valuation in opposition to the more negative valuation that men hold of women. Belief systems that approximate this type, it should be stressed, have been emerging on our home ground with increased frequency. Type 2 systems are found in the West today in many regions and milieus in which women have espoused certain ideas of the women's movement, particularly in its more summary, publicized form. In these cases, the political stance might be summarized as follows: women are "as good as men," and so women seek to attain self-actualization by reaching for ac-

ceptance in traditional male arenas. The goal is treatment on a par with men, with male-associated attributes and prerogatives maintaining preeminence.

Although the West provides its examples of belief systems of this kind, it should be stressed that type 2 systems appear to be much more widespread in their incidence. Other parts of the world, particularly those in which attempts are now being made at the national level to raise women's position to that of men, often display ideological patterns of this kind. In a sense this is expectable, for Western stances frequently provide a model for these reform movements. Type 2 systems, however, also appear to be indigenous to certain non-Western societies. Strathern describes one such system for Mt. Hagen, New Guinea (Strathern 1972). There, men see women as mere producers while women affirm their crucial importance to the society at large.

As can be expected, type 2 systems tend to evoke somewhat different sociopolitical responses from those evoked by type 3 systems. In particular, since women share a heightened opinion of their own capabilities, their protests for equal rights can be more comfortably made in the public arena. Public espousal of their goals is also less difficult because male supremacy is only indirectly challenged, for example, through increased competition for men's jobs. Rather than evoking closet acts of rebellion, the type 2 pattern therefore provides a context for more public declarations of protest. The keynote of such movements thus can be and often is reform.

Other aspects of type 2 systems, however, seem to thwart the prospect of far-reaching change in male-female relations. Since men continue to value women and women's activities less highly, men continue to shun involvement in those tasks and occupations. This makes the ultimate redistribution of power and prestige between men and women more difficult, for there is increased competition for men's positions while women have increased difficulty in reallocating traditionally female tasks.

Type 4 systems, by contrast, have somewhat different political implications because the structural inversion is complete. On the one hand, women can more easily profit politically from their positive self-image, a self-image that encourages them to seek various benefits forcefully, for the latter are seen by them as their due. As such, women's strivings come to be clothed in an aura of legitimacy, and women are provided with an optimal mind-set for protest. On the other hand, however, a type 4 ideology brings its own problems with respect to its expression and enactment in the public arena. In some senses, it cannot be as easily accepted by men as can an ideology of type 2, for women's ideology in type 4 societies is essentially oppositional; its message is neither comforting to, nor supportive of, men, but rather is directly and openly threatening.

Type 4 ideologies, of course, need not be asserted openly and completely at each political occasion. Rather, women can stress one or another part of the ideology, manipulating it according to the issue, situation, audience, and need. In this sense, it provides women with a maximal opportunity for protest, for it supports a full array of overt and covert techniques. Veiled acts of rebellion present their possibilities, as do the public path of reform and the call for rebellion and resistance.

An example of a type 4 system is provided by the Mundurucu (Murphy and Murphy 1974). While Mundurucu men accord their religious activities a primary importance within the workings of their society, Mundurucu women regard these involvements as rather useless and quaint. Men thus see themselves as serious and responsible, while women regard men as naive and childish. By contrast, men depict women as limited in their symbolic and intellectual capabilities, while women see themselves as responsible and appropriately focused upon down-to-earth matters.

Mundurucu women have followed several pathways in the pursuit of a more comfortable fate. Well aware of the repercussions that would be entailed by voicing their views,

they generally have made little direct challenge to the male ideology that relegates them to a secondary status. Thus, although an oppositional stance is theoretically plausible, these women have typically left that alternative in abeyance. Rather they have directed their protests piecemeal, at particularly bothersome situations. They have especially done this through scathing complaint. Women, for example, berate men for gang-raping women. They deem such behavior to be cruel and arbitrary and try to protect women from this fate. They also scold men for not helping sufficiently with female tasks like manioc processing. On one notable occasion, men succumbed to these protests and took up the grating of the tubers in response to women's acerbic complaints. Finally, and perhaps most importantly from a political vantage, women's dissatisfaction has often been directly aimed at changing women's social, sexual, and economic situations: nuclear family living, greater protection of female sexuality, and a more equitable division of labor have been some of the Mundurucu women's ultimate goals (Murphy and Murphy 1974:137-138).

All the ideological systems thus far presented have different contents and forms from the one that has been an integral part of our Western heritage. In England, Germany, and France (as distinct from Mediterranean Europe), and in the United States as a cultural offshoot, sexual ideology has generally approximated type 1, at least into the recent period. A doctrine of male superiority and female inferiority has been espoused by men and women alike, and the forms of political activism, in many of their broad strokes, have been in keeping with these sexual perceptions.

I do not wish to review the courses of those movements that have been variously called the women's movement or women's liberation in the United States and Western Europe. Each course has been complex and unique, each serving as a convoluted response to its group's sociohistorical experience. I do, however, find it useful to focus upon one element that is common to these recent Western political movements, an element that remains a major emotive core of the women's movement and a highly complex structural phenomenon in its own right: consciousness raising.

Consciousness raising, of course, forms a major element in any coordinated movement through which subordinated groups seek the redistribution of power and prestige in egalitarian terms. Hence it is not the existence of the phenomenon per se that is of interest so much as the relative weight that it is given within a total political configuration, and the success that it has had in comparison to other mechanisms for change (for example, the drive for reform legislation, the creation of cadres, the carrying out of acts of rebellion and resistance).

When viewed in these terms, consciousness raising undoubtedly constitutes the most successful focus of the women's movement in the West. Other political tactics, by contrast, have lagged behind in their success and in the involvement of their adherents. I would submit, however, that this seeming limitedness is not necessarily a sign of the movement's inviability as much as a logical response to a complex political configuration of which a type 1 ideology is an integral part.

From the vantage point of beliefs about women's and men's innate qualities, type 1 ideological systems require the most comprehensive revision if a belief in men's and women's equality is to be succored and implemented. According to the type 1 form, women do not see men and women as equal in either a positive or negative sense (as occurs in type 2 and type 3 systems, respectively); nor do they affirm their own worthiness, either among themselves or to the populace at large (as occurs or can occur in type 2 and type 4 systems). Instead, shifts in attitude must doubly occur if sexual equality is to find support in women's minds. The shift from a type 1 to a type 2 sexual ideology during the recent period represents one major step in this direction. That step, however, is still a preliminary one, for type 2 systems have their own political problems. In sum, the changeover to an ultimately egalitarian

tarian stance by both sexes has required a large and continuing expenditure of energy, while the psychological set and interpersonal situations of women in such a system make it particularly hard for them to act effectively. Given this combination of parameters, a marked emphasis upon consciousness raising and a hesitancy in utilizing additional political techniques is not surprising.

conclusion

In anthropology and in other disciplines in the social sciences, an identity of beliefs about maleness and femaleness among the male and female portions of any society has typically been assumed. Men are deemed superior, women are deemed inferior, and both men and women in any sexually inegalitarian society are presumed to believe it. From a Western perspective, this seems the logical ideological content of a sociopolitical system that is characterized by male dominance and female subordination. Correspondingly, the pathways seem clear cut with respect to implementing change.

As Moroccan, Mt. Hagen, Mundurucu, and other data demonstrate, however, this presumption of ideological homogeneity constitutes yet another Western ethnocentrism. It reflects the form of our own sexual ideology, which is but one of many that are found in sexually inegalitarian societies. Similarly, the political methods that have been utilized in the West in order to implement change in no way emerge as inevitably appropriate for all sexually inegalitarian social systems. Rather, they should more readily be regarded as logical responses to the stumbling blocks that the Western ideological and behavioral complex entails. Other responses are possible; indeed other sorts of sexual ideologies promote different political responses, as data from other societies indicate.

The mapping of these differences encourages reappraisals of various sorts. At one level, the data here presented stand as a call for more careful ethnography, particularly with respect to ideological systems. They also call to mind the need for a more sensitive analysis of ideology's behavioral linkages. At yet another level, these data underscore the need for Westerners to reexamine their models for change. Non-Westerners, men and women, often assert that they cannot and do not want to be locked into a Western-style program for sexual equality (for example, Mernissi 1975). These protestations are frequently with good cause, as has been seen. It might be added that the relevance of that stance extends to the planning of egalitarian reform movements generally.

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