دانلود رایگان ترجمه مقاله مدیران زن و مدیریت عایدات در شرکت های پیشرفته (نشریه امرالد ۲۰۱۲) (ترجمه رایگان – برنزی ⭐️)
این مقاله انگلیسی ISI در نشریه امرالد در ۲۹ صفحه در سال ۲۰۱۲ منتشر شده و ترجمه آن ۱۶ صفحه میباشد. کیفیت ترجمه این مقاله رایگان – برنزی ⭐️ بوده و به صورت خلاصه و ناقص ترجمه شده است.
| دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی + خرید ترجمه فارسی | |
| عنوان فارسی مقاله: |
مدیران زن و مدیریت عایدات در شرکت های پیشرفته |
| عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: |
Female directors and earnings management in high-technology firms |
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| مشخصات مقاله انگلیسی (PDF) | |
| سال انتشار | ۲۰۱۲ |
| تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی | ۲۹ صفحه با فرمت pdf |
| رشته های مرتبط با این مقاله | مدیریت و حسابداری |
| گرایش های مرتبط با این مقاله | مدیریت کسب و کار، حسابداری مدیریت، مدیریت مالی، حسابداری مالی |
| چاپ شده در مجله (ژورنال) | بررسی حسابداری اقیانوس آرام – Pacific Accounting Review |
| کلمات کلیدی | مدیریت عایدات، کیفیت عایدات، جنسیت، انگیزش زنان، هیئت مدیره، مدیریت، نظارت و کنترل امور شرکت |
| رفرنس | دارد ✓ |
| کد محصول | F1203 |
| نشریه | امرالد – Emerald |
| مشخصات و وضعیت ترجمه فارسی این مقاله | |
| وضعیت ترجمه | انجام شده و آماده دانلود |
| تعداد صفحات ترجمه تایپ شده با فرمت ورد با قابلیت ویرایش | ۱۶ صفحه با فونت ۱۴ B Nazanin |
| ترجمه عناوین جداول | ترجمه شده است ☓ |
| ترجمه متون داخل جداول | ترجمه نشده است ☓ |
| درج جداول در فایل ترجمه | درج نشده است ☓ |
| کیفیت ترجمه | کیفیت ترجمه این مقاله متوسط میباشد |
| توضیحات | ترجمه این مقاله به صورت ناقص و خلاصه انجام شده است |
| فهرست مطالب |
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چکیده |
| بخشی از ترجمه |
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چکیده |
| بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی |
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Abstract Purpose – This study, based on a merger of gender and accounting theories, aims to explore whether and how earnings management is affected by the presence of female directors on the board of directors and on the audit committee. Design/methodology/approach – The study employs both a univariate and multivariate analysis approach to explore the relation between female directors and earnings management in high-technology firms. In the analysis, two contemporary ex-post measures of earnings management, discretionary accruals and nonoperating accruals, as well as two ex-ante measures of earnings management, Big4 auditor and financial leverage are applied. Findings – The paper finds evidence for a negative relation between the presence of female directors and earnings management. The findings indicate that accounting aggressiveness is affected by the proportion of women on the board of directors as well as on the audit committee. Furthermore, the paper find evidences indicating that earnings management is lower when either the CEO or the CFO is a woman. Notably, in firms with a higher female representation in corporate governance and/or in top management, external monitoring by auditors and creditors seems to be weaker, yet earnings quality is higher. Additional analysis suggests that the gender of directors has value implications for analysts and investors; specifically, there is a positive relation between the proportion of female directors and the firm’s value. The findings are supported by several gender theories and findings regarding women’s motivation and achievement, moral values, social stereotypes and the relation between task performance and self-confidence. Originality/value – This study associates the gender of directors with earnings management by firms. The study contributes to the growing body of literature on earnings management. It should be useful to researchers, regulators, investors, analysts and creditors as well as other players in the capital markets, as it presents a new and important aspect that needs to be accounted for when assessing the quality of firms’ accounting information.. ۱٫ Introduction Revelations of massive accounting frauds involving large corporations (e.g. Enron) have drawn growing academic attention to the incentives of managers to manage earnings. While the evidence on capital market motives for earnings management is abundant, the academic literature on the relationship between earnings management and the gender of the firm’s directors is scarce. Notably, such research requires gender theories to be incorporated into the accounting discipline. The gender perspective may increase understanding of the motives for and the extent of engaging in accounting manipulation. The claim at the heart of this perspective is that gender has implications for engaging in certain behaviors and abstaining from others due to role expectations associated with gender. Markedly, a gender-based explanation will clarify the socio-cultural context against which decisions are made within the organization. In this study, we associate earnings management by high-technology firms with the gender of its directors. Specifically, we seek to explore the effect of the presence of female directors on the board of directors (henceforth BOD) and on the audit committee on earnings management. This allows us to corroborate evidence from the BOD setting with evidence from the audit committee setting, both of which are instrumental in overseeing management in order to control opportunistic management behavior such as earnings management. In an additional analysis, we test the effect of chief executive officer (CEO)/chief financial officer (CFO) gender on earnings management. We differentiate between independent directors and executive managers because earnings management may be conducted by executive managers (CFO and CEO in particular), but it should be detected and deterred by independent directors. The study uses a sample of Israeli high-technology firms listed in the USA (traded on the NYSE or the NASDAQ) between 2002 and 2009. The Israeli case is particularly interesting since up until only a few years ago, women in Israel were virtually unrepresented on company boards[1]. Currently, the proportion of women on the boards of public companies in Israel is around 15 percent, similar to that in the USA. For comparison, the proportion of women on the boards of public companies around the world is: 7.8 percent in Germany, 10 percent in Spain[2], 11.5 percent in the UK, 12 percent in The Netherlands, 13 percent in Canada, 18 percent in Denmark, 26 percent in Finland, 27 percent in Sweden, and 44 percent in Norway (Bermig and Frick, 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Catalyst, 2009). The high percentage of female board members in Norway is due to its quota system. Thus, the issue of the impact of female directors on earnings quality, and whether female representation on company boards should be increased in general, and by law in particular, is also relevant for the USA as well as most European countries (Srinidhi et al., 2011). The Israeli Government is currently promoting a bill that will increase the representation of women on the BODs of public companies. The purpose is to force companies to appoint a specific number of women to their BODs, such that women would constitute approximately 50 percent of board members[3]. Furthermore, companies will be obligated to publish information related to the integration of women in the company[4]. In the study, we focus on high-technology firms. Sample homogeneity is particularly germane in the context of our study, as firms are subject to different earnings-management incentives due to regulation or other industry-specific factors. For example, financial firms are subject to earnings-management incentives that are more complex due to regulation and other factors (Burgstahler and Eames, 2003; De Franco et al., 2011). Additionally, different industries differ in key attributes such as R&D intensity, profit margins, growth prospects, financial risks, reliance on collaboration with other companies and lifecycle stage, which also potentially affect earnings-management incentives and value implications of earnings management. Hence, our study, dealing with management intent and inadequate oversight in reporting biased earnings results, requires a homogeneous group of firms. The restriction to high-technology companies ensures that our sample consists of a sufficiently large and fairly homogeneous sample. The high-tech sector also makes an interesting case for studying female directors’ behavior, as this sector is characterized by challenges, frequent change and ongoing uncertainty. According to gender literature, we are dealing with women who have shattered the “glass ceiling” and worked their way into positions that require skills, behavior and a degree of risk-taking that was previously related to men (Jenkins, 1987; Morrison et al., 2004). The literature indicates that these women have broken down the cultural barriers by proving that women can also serve in high-ranking positions. Notably, in the study we show that the representation of female directors on the boards of Israeli high-tech firms has reached the average level in Israel – about 15 percent. In the analysis, we apply two contemporary measures of earnings management: discretionary accruals and nonoperating accruals. Discretionary accruals are from the widely applied modified Jones (1991) model, augmented to control for the impact of firm performance on accruals (Kothari et al., 2005) and for growth (McNichols, 2002). Nonoperating accruals are as described by Givoly and Hayn (2000). This measure serves as an alternative proxy for earnings management, which avoids empirical concerns regarding the Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995; Erickson and Wang, 1999). Following prior research (Aboody et al., 2005; Raman and Shahrur, 2008), we use the absolute value of discretionary, as well as nonoperating, accruals to estimate the magnitude of earnings management. We define our calculated abnormal accruals measures to be ex-post measures of earnings management. Next, we identify the existence of a Big4 auditor and the degree of firm leverage as ex-ante measures of earnings management, based on the conjecture that improved external monitoring will reduce both the bias and noise in reported earnings (Francis et al., 1999; Yu, 2007). Employing both a univariate and multivariate analysis approach, we find evidence for a negative relation between the proportion of female directors and earnings management. The effect of the presence of women on the audit committee is similar to that on the BOD. The findings imply that female directors improve board monitoring as they constrain earnings management more than their male counterparts[5]. Alternatively, it may be that firms employing a larger number of women in top management and/or governance positions are, at the outset, firms with a higher awareness of the need for balance in business, they maintain higher social, environmental, legal and ethical standings, and they care about how they are perceived by the public. In these firms, higher quality earnings may be a direct result of the higher standards the firm holds as an entity. Nonetheless, the relation between the social, environmental, legal, ethical and moral standings of a firm, and the presence of women in high positions, together with the quality of earnings, need to be further explored in future research. We also find evidence indicating that earnings management is significantly lower when either the CEO or the CFO is a woman[6]. Furthermore, we find that in firms with a higher female representation in corporate governance and/or in top management, external monitoring by auditors and creditors is weaker, yet earnings management is lower. A possible interpretation of this seeming conundrum is that the presence of women serves as internal monitoring. Finally, additional analysis suggests that the gender of directors has value implications for analysts and investors; specifically, there exists a positive relation between the proportion of female directors and the firm’s value. Our findings are supported by the gender literature, which indicates a tendency towards conciliatory behavior by women in high-pressure situations compared to dictatorial-type behavior by men. These studies claim that, in fact, women complement men in management and bring a healthy balance to business (Malach Pines, 1989; Morrison et al., 2004). The findings are also consistent with studies showing that female managers tend to take fewer risks than male managers (Powel and Ansic, 1997; Barber and Odean, 2001). Gender theory also suggests that women will not undertake a task – even if they anticipate success at it – unless they value it morally (Eccles, 1994). Furthermore, studies relating gender to ethical values theorize women to be more ethical in their judgments and behaviors than men (O’Fallon and Butterfield, 2003; Vermeir and Van Kenhove, 2007), and thus more likely to report illegal acts (Miethe and Rothschild, 1994) and fraudulent financial reporting (Kaplan et al., 2009). Additional studies, focusing on female directors, show that the presence of women improves the functioning and efficiency of the BOD as well as the firm’s performance and value (Huse and Solberg, 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). Hence, gender-based differences, fear of negative results due to misrepresentation of earnings and moral considerations, among other things, may offer an explanation for the findings that female executives abstain from, and female directors constrain and deter, earnings management more than do men. If female directors have an effect on their male counterparts, as documented in the gender literature, the overall reaction of the board can be affected by the women present, who will “raise the flag” of morality, strengthening the firm’s internal monitoring by putting a heavier weight on the ethical considerations in the board’s decisions. The economic implication of our findings is that a regulatory move to increase the representation of women on corporate BODs may lead to a business world where the levels of fair disclosure and quality of earnings are higher. Furthermore, our study has a practical implication in that if the issue of the appropriate representation of women on BODs is related to the quality of financial reporting of companies, then it is part of the public interest; as such, it merits the oversight of the regulator. The study contributes to the growing body of literature on earnings management. It should be useful to researchers, regulators, investors, analysts and creditors as well as other players in the capital markets, as it presents a new and important aspect that needs to be accounted for when assessing the quality of firms’ accounting information. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains our literature review. Section 3 describes our sample and presents our earnings management metrics. Section 4 discusses our research methods and results. Section 5 presents some additional analysis of the valuation implications of the presence of female directors. Section 6 concludes.. |
| دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی + خرید ترجمه فارسی | |
| عنوان فارسی مقاله: |
مدیران زن و مدیریت عایدات در شرکت های پیشرفته |
| عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: |
Female directors and earnings management in high-technology firms |
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