دانلود ترجمه مقاله اقلام تعهدی و عملکرد بازده سهام – مجله اسپرینگر

بخشی از ترجمه:

دراین این مقاله ارتباط بین تامین مالی نابه هنجار خارجی و اقلام تعهدی نابه نجار به وسیله تمرکز جداگانه بر روی اقلام تعهدی سرمایه در گردش و اقلام تعهدی بلند مدت مورد بررسی قرار گرفت. ما فهمیدیم که تامین مالی خارجی و اقلام تعهدی پرتفوی کاهش خطر، نه تنه امولد بازده بالاتری است بلکه همچنین فرصتهای آماری آربیتراژی را تشکیل می دهد.تجزیه و تحلیل سطح پرتفولیو و سطح شرکتها از طریق رگرسیون مقطعی نشان می دهد که توانایی معیارهای تامین مالی خارجی در پیش¬بینی بازده سهام همچنان پس ازکنترل اقلام تعهدی سرمایه در گردش به قوت خود باقیست . به هر حال این توانایی با کنترل اقلام تعهدی بلند مدت به طور قابل ملاحظه ای کاهش می یابد. نتایج ما با شکست سرمایه گذاران برای تشخیص سرمایه گذاری بیش از حد مرتبط با فعالیت و یا مدیریت فرصت طلبانه عایدی ها مطابقت دارد.

مقدمه: بسیاری از مطالعات انجام شده بیانگر رابطه منفی بین فعالیتهای تامین مالی شرکتها و بازده سهام در آینده است که اصطلاحاً تامین مالی نابه هنجار نامیده می شود. فعالیتهای افزایش (توزیع)سرمایه با کم(زیاد)شدن بازده در آینده همراه است. این رابطه طیف گسترده ای از فعالیت های تامین مالی خارجی و حتی کل فعالیتهای تامین مالی را تشکیل می دهد. در ارتباط با این مطالعات، مستندات پژوهشی زیادی نیز وجود دارد که بیانگر رابطه منفی میان سطح اقلام تعهدی حسابداری و بازده سهام در آینده است که اصطلاحاً اقلام تعهدی نابه هنجار نامیده می شود: شرکتها همراه افزایش(کاهش) اقلام تعهدی ،بازده کمتر(بیشتری)را تجربه می کنند.این ارتباط شامل اقلام تعهدی سرمایه در گردش و اقلام بلندمدت و کل اقلام تعهدی می باشد. مطالعات اخیر توسط کوهن (٢٠٠۶)، ، ریچاردسون و اسلوان (٢٠٠٨) ، و وانگ (٢٠١٠) و ریچاردسون و اسلوان (٢٠٠٣) بیانگرارائه تلاشی سیستماتیک برای بررسی ارتباط بین این نابه هنجاری در بازار است.

بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:

abstract This paper investigates the relation of the external financing anomaly with the accrual anomaly, by focusing separately on working capital accruals and long-term accruals. We find that external financing and accrual hedge portfolios not only generate superior returns, but they also constitute statistical arbitrage opportunities. Portfolio-level analysis and firm-level cross-sectional regressions show that the ability of external financing measures in predicting future returns remains strong, after controlling for working capital accruals. However, this ability is substantially reduced after controlling for long-term accruals. Our results appear to be consistent with investors’ failure to recognise agencyrelated overinvestment and/or opportunistic earnings management.
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 1. Introduction An extensive body of literature documents a negative relation between corporate financing activities and future stock returns, the so-called “external financing anomaly”: activities raising (distributing) capital are associated with low (high) future returns.1 This relation holds for a wide range of external financing activities (Ritter, 2003) and even to overall external financing activities (Bradshaw, Richardson, & Sloan, 2006). Associated with these studies, there is also a large literature documenting a negative relation between the level of accounting accruals and future stock returns, the so-called “accrual anomaly”: firms with high (low) accruals experience low (high) future returns.2 The relation holds for working capital accruals (Sloan, 1996), and long-term and total accruals (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna, 2005). Recent studies by Cohen and Lys (2006), Dechow, Richardson, and Sloan (2008), Hardouvelis, Papanastasopoulos, Thomakos, and Wang (2010) and Richardson and Sloan (2003) provide a systematic attempt to investigate the association between these market anomalies. Collectively, these studies show that the external financing anomaly mainly captures the effects of the anomaly on total accruals. Put another way, these market anomalies are not independent but rather the two sides of the same coin. relation of these two anomalies, such as managerial market timing, opportunistic earnings management and agency-related overinvestment, distress risk and risk induced by changes in the mix of growth options and assets in place. While the existing evidence suggests that the external financing anomaly and the anomaly on total accruals are related asset pricing regularities, it does not imply that we yet fully understand why this may be so. This incomplete understanding of the link between these anomalies is our essential motivation in this paper: we investigate this relation by focusing on working capital accruals and long-term accruals separately. The key innovation of our research is that we develop and test hypotheses concerning how common driving forces vary conditional on the type of accounting accrual. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we expand on our motivation and present the literature review and our research design; in Section 3 we present our data, sample formation and variable measurement; in Section 4 we critically discuss our results. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in Section 5. 2. Motivation, literature review and research design In this section, we go over the existing evidence on external financing and the accrual anomaly that motivate us to investigate in detail their interrelationship. We attempt, based on the literature, to explicitly show how these anomalies could be related and where our work differs in its motivation and methodology. 2.1. Motivation and literature review The external financing anomaly refers to the negative relation between external financing activities and stock returns. Activities raising new capital such as initial public offerings, seasoned equity offerings, debt offerings and bank borrowings are associated with low future stock returns. Activities distributing capital such as stock repurchases, dividend initiations and debt repayments are associated with high future stock returns. Bradshaw et al. (2006) use a measure of net cash flows generated by both equity and debt financing activities and find that it is also negatively related with future stock returns. Notably, this extended measure of net external financing is associated with even greater returns. As argued by Bradshaw et al. (2006), two prominent hypotheses – managerial market timing and earnings management – can be put forward to interpret these findings. Based on the market timing hypothesis, firm executives tend to issue (repurchase) securities when they are temporarily overvalued (undervalued) to exploit market mispricing (see Loughran & Ritter, 1995). Consistent with the above, Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Ritter (2003) find that earnings performance is associated with a rising trend up to the share issue, but it deteriorates after the share issue. Based on the earning management hypothesis, managers opportunistically overstate earnings around periods in which they raise external financing by exploiting (discretionary) accruals to increase the offering proceeds. Investors fail to understand earnings management, resulting in an overvaluation of issuing firms. When earnings management reverses, investors downwardly revalue issuing firms to a level justified by fundamentals. Heron and Lie (2004), Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) provide evidence consistent with this explanation. As a competing explanation, Bradshaw et al. (2006) offer the agency-related overinvestment hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, managers could invest net cash proceeds from external financing activities in zero or negative net present value (NPV) projects to serve their own interests. When investors learn that such expenditures dissipate firm value, stock prices adjust downward. In other words, lower stock returns of issuing firms are just a reflection of value destruction due to overinvestment. This explanation is consistent with the anecdotes concerning investor and manager hubris during ‘hot issue’ markets. One can think at least two risk-based explanations to interpret Bradshaw et al.’s (2006) evidence on the external financing anomaly. First, issuing firms have lower distress risk, and thus are priced to yield lower expected return (see Eckbo, Masulis, & Norli, 2000). Second, based on the model of Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) firms that invest, thereby exercising growth options (i.e. convert growth options into real assets), have lower expected returns because an underlying asset is less risky than an option on that asset. Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006) provide empirical support for the negative relation between capital investment (growth rate in capital expenditures) and equity risk, while Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2008) find less underperformance of issuing firms after conditioning on aggregate investment factors. The accrual anomaly, first documented by Sloan (1996), refers to the negative relation between the level of accounting accruals and future stock returns: firms with high (low) accruals experience low (high) future returns. Following Healy (1985), Sloan (1996) focuses in his analysis purely on working capital accruals. Richardson et al. (2005) show a negative relation between long-term accruals and future movements in stock prices. They also extend the definition of accruals to include longterm accruals and show that this extended measure of total accruals is also associated with even greater returns. Existing research offers a variety of explanations to interpret the accrual anomaly. Xie (2001) and Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2006) argue that the anomaly is mainly attributable to investors misunderstanding earnings management. Dechow et al. (2008) provide an alternative interpretation: the accrual anomaly could be driven by hubris concerning new investment opportunities due to a combination of diminishing marginal returns to increased investment and agency-related overinvestment. Khan (2008) concludes that the anomaly is simply compensation for higher distress risk. In this paper we expand on the recent literature (see below) that shows a link between these two anomalies and, furthermore, we attempt to provide a tentative explanation for this link. The cash flow conservation equation implies that cash flows from financing activities and cash flows from operations (after taking into account cash investment in operations) G. Papanastasopoulos et al. / The British Accounting Review 43 (2011) 214–229 215 are negatively related. Accounting accruals represent the difference between earnings and operating cash flows. In other words, accruals represent growth in net operating assets on a firms’ balance sheet. Accruals can rise when net cash proceeds from external financing activities are booked as net operating assets, rather than used for refinancing, retained as financial assets or expensed through the income statement. Nevertheless, accruals can also rise as issuing firms inflate earnings above cash flows. Thus, firms raising (distributing) capital are more likely to have high (low) accruals: it is therefore possible that the external financing anomaly and the accrual anomaly are related to asset pricing regularities. This relation could be explained by investors’ misunderstanding of earnings management, but does not require it. Several other common driving forces can also be considered: managerial market timing, misunderstanding of overinvestment, default risk, and risk induced by changes in the mix of growth options and assets in place.The potential relation between external financing and accruals anomaly has been first assessed by Richardson and Sloan (2003). They document that the negative drift in returns following external financing activities is strongest when net cash proceeds are used to fund growth in operating assets, suggesting that they are recorded as accruals. Richardson and Sloan (2003) argue that their findings are most consistent with a combination of opportunistic earnings management and agency-related overinvestment. Cohen and Lys (2006) show that after controlling for total accruals, the negative relation between net external financing and future stock returns is attenuated and not statistically significant. They interpret their findings as more consistent with overinvestment rather than with market timing. Dechow et al. (2008) find that net external financing trading portfolios do not yield significant returns, conditional on reinvested earnings (the sum of total accruals and retained cash flows). Hardouvelis et al. (2010) show that, conditional on measures of past performance, firms with high (low) net external financing are characterized by high (low) accruals attributable to managerial discretion and exhibit poor (strong) future stock price performance. They argue that opportunistic earnings management constitutes an important driving force of the external financing anomaly. While the existing evidence suggests that the external financing anomaly mainly captures the effects of the anomaly on total accruals, it does not imply that the concept of this relation per se is explained away. This issue motivates us to investigate this relation by focusing on accruals from different business activities separately. Accounting accruals can be decomposed into two major categories based on the underlying business activity they capture working capital accruals and long-term accruals. Working capital accruals reflect information embodied in operating activities, while long-term accruals relate to investing activities (i.e., they refer to accruals arising from accounting for investment in net long-term operating assets). We argue that accrual components should be considered separately for at least two reasons. First, as long as they are not perfectly correlated, they could provide a more detailed classification of firms with high (low) net external financing. Second, and more importantly, they could provide a more accurate picture of the rationale of the association between the external financing anomaly and the accrual anomaly.