دانلود ترجمه مقاله تعهد با رویکرد اعتماد سازی – نشریه اسپرینگر

• فهرست مطالب:

 چکیده
مقدمه
سه مدل از حکومت
روابط تعهدی
انجمن
مدل تعهد
اجرای سیستمیک
اعتماد سازی
اجرای کلی
چالش
نتیجه گیری

• بخشی از ترجمه:

به توجه به این واقعیت که شرکت های بزرگ آمریکایی در تلاش برای به دست آوردن اعتماد به نفس عمومی هستند، اصولی که بر اساس آن شرکت های این کشور اداره می شود به نظر می رسد شایسته بررسی دقیق می باشند. مدل روابط تعهدی ارائه شده در این مقاله جایگزینی اخلاقی مناسبی در تئوری نمایندگی و تئوری ذینفعان می باشد. اگر چه این مدل تعهدی بعید است که به سرعت پذیرفته شود، لذا مفروضات و اصول آن مورد بررسی قرار گرفته و آزمایشات عملی انجام شده است. به عنوان الگو برای حکومت اخلاقی نظریه تعهد بر پایه اخلاق است که به لحاظ نظری و پایه و اساس علمی نیزتایید می شود. آزمایش های بیشتر ازاین مدل به نظر می رسد با توجه به تقاضای چهار چوب اخلاقی و معنوی اجتماعی بیشتر سزاوار کسب و کار آمریکا خواهد بود.
مدل رهبری تعهدی، ارائه شده و در این مقاله به شرح فرصت ها با طیف گسترده ای از تحقیقات آینده پرداخته شده است. یک منطقه به طوربالقوه پربار از آزمون و پژوهش وجود دارد که برای شناسایی سازمان برجسته و ازلحاظ مالی موفق می باشد. یکی دیگر از مناطق بالقوه غنی ازلحاظ کار تحقیقاتی مدل های ذهنی اخلاقی مدیران شرکت ها و هیئت مدیره و کارکنان است. بررسی این مدل ها درزمینه درک نظریه حکومت می تواند دیدگاه های خود را آن گونه که لازم است برای حفظ نظریه مباشرت به عنوان یک سیستم جدید مدیریت شرکت های بزرگ ارائه کند. فرصت های پژوهشی اضافی ازطریق تحقیقات کیفی در واحد کار و یا سازمان براساس آزمون وجود دارد.

• بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:

Introduction American businesses and corporate executives are faced with a serious problem: the loss of pubUc confidence. This lack of trust has been accompanied by profound pubUc criticism, increased government controls, and growing expectations for not only improved financial performance, but also increased accountabiUty for financial results (Alkhafaji, 1989). At issue is corporate governance ? how a firm is managed to optimize performance and who is doing the governing. At risk is the “consequential impU cations of reciprocal dependence and vulnerabiUty between participants” (DingwaU, 1983, p. 12). Put more simply, governance systems seek to balance trust and accountability, recognizing that the form of the relationship between parties directly influences the wiUingness to trust (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998). This paper suggests that the organizational gov ernance theories of traditional agency and stake holder theory are fundamentaUy inadequate to build trust. We propose an alternative theory and ap proach based on managerial stewardship. In this paper, we briefly compare agency theory, stake holder theory, and stewardship theory as models of organizational governance. We propose that stew ardship theory offers a system of governance that is ethicaUy consistent with the needs of organizations in today’s business environ. We conclude by pro viding insights into the key implementation steps that are important in implementing an ethicaUy consistent stewardship model ? key steps for restoring and rebu?ding pubHc trust. Three models of governance The governance form selected by an organization is based on decisions to reduce any potential exchange problems created by bounded rationaHty, on the one hand, and the threat of opportunism, on the other hand (Barney and Hesterley, 1996). The expectation is that the manager ? or agent ? w?l maximize performance for the benefits of shareholders and other controUing interests. However, as trust erodes, an increase in organizational performance may be offset by increases in the costs of attaining it (WiUiamson, 1975). Traditional approaches to corporate governance, typified by agency theory and stakeholder theory, have been expensive to direct and have focused on short-term profits and organizational systems that fail to achieve desired results (Baucus and Beck-Dudley, 2000). Agency theory assumes that humans are self-, interested and prone to opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989). Arrow (1985) notes two sources of agency problems. First, moral hazard, or hidden actions are costly to observe. Second, adverse selection, or hidden information is costly to ascertain. Monitoring and bonding agents in order to control their opportunism are two approaches that deal with these two problems. Thus, the solutions are driven by a lack of trust and increase the cost of doing business. According to agency theory, shareholders repre sent the only interests that managers should be concerned with in making decisions (Jensen, 1988; Jensen and MeckHng, 1976). Managers, on the other hand, are presumed to be self-interested and, unless constrained, wiU inevitably behave in self-interested ways (CaneUa and Monroe, 1997). Agents may emphasize growth over profitability, since their individual compensation typicaUy depends upon firm size. Alternatively, they may consume excess perks, or may initiate strategies that yoke them to the firm and make it difficult for the firm to remove them. The assignment of a competent “agent” to manage the organization aUows shareholders to diversify their portfolios and aUows managers, who may lack resources for ownership, to speciaHze in managing. Although the separation of ownership from control has many benefits, this separation also has a number of associated costs. Prominent among these costs are agency problems, which frequently manifest in opportunistic behavior by managers (WiUiamson, 1975). Agency problems exist because principals (shareholders) and agents (managers) have differing risk preferences and have conflicting interests (Eisenhardt, 1989).