دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی مدل های تکامل توانایی برای مدیریت سازمانی صنایع نفت به همراه ترجمه فارسی
| عنوان فارسی مقاله: | مدل های تکامل توانایی برای مدیریت سازمانی صنایع نفت |
| عنوان انگلیسی مقاله: | Capability maturity models for offshore organisational management |
| رشته های مرتبط: | مهندسی صنایع و پزشکی، ایمنی صنعتی، بهداشت حرفه ای و مهندسی سیستم های سلامت |
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| نشریه | الزویر – Elsevier |
| کد محصول | f385 |
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بخشی از ترجمه فارسی مقاله: 1- مقدمه |
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بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی: 1. Introduction All businesses need to manage the health and safety, environmental and financial risks to which they are exposed and good risk management practice is now recognised as essential at the highest business level (Turnbull, 1999). In the UK the management of safety and environment are subject to regulatory controls which aim to ensure that companies place proper and appropriate emphasis on these important issues. However, the regulatory approach has important implications for the organisation and in particular their capability to manage safety and risk. In the safety field, ever since the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act, the UK has been creating a “goal setting” regulatory framework (Health and Safety Commission, 2004) in which those who create the risks are made responsible for assessing and controlling them. This includes demonstrating that the risks have been reduced to a level which is acceptable or is as low as reasonably practical. In the UK environmental field, an integrated approach to pollution protection and control has been adopted (DEFRA, 2004). This regulatory regime, while not risk based, is certainly target setting in approach. Its main purpose is to achieve a high level of protection by prevention of emissions or, where this is not possible, by reducing emissions to air, water and land. The regulatory approach in this case is through the determination and enforcement of permit conditions, based on best available technology. In practice this means setting conditions for acceptable levels of discharge of pollutants and ensuring that these are not exceeded. The success of any regulatory regime is dependent on the capability of the risk generating organisations to manage their risks. A goal setting regime, for example, will clearly demand a higher level of management capability than say a prescriptive regime in which the risk generator is largely directed by others in how to manage their risks. As regulatory regimes move towards goal setting approaches, performance measurement and capability assessment become increasingly important in the achievement of the highest levels of safety and environmental protection. The main aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of the capability maturity model of organisations and the application of the design safety capability maturity model to the offshore industry and its relevance in an increasingly goal setting regulatory environment. 2. The UK offshore safety regime The current approach to safety in the UK is embodied in the Offshore Installations Safety Case Regulations (Health and Safety Executive, 1992). This regulation requires that all hazards with the potential to cause a major accident have been identified, that the risks have been evaluated and that measures are put in place to reduce the risks to a level that is “as low as reasonably practicable” or ALARP. The Safety Case Regulations were supplemented by a series of supporting regulations, one of which has particular relevance to the capability maturity approach; the Design and Construction Regulations in 1996 (Health and Safety Executive, 1996). These installations required the identification of safety critical elements (SCE) for the installation, which are those parts of an installation that could cause or contribute substantially to a major accident hazard if they failed, and those whose purpose is to prevent or limit the effects of a major accident hazard, i.e. the “measures” put in place to reduce risks to personnel. The Design and Construction Regulations also required a “Verification Scheme” to be put in place for all safety critical elements; a process which involves examination of the design or its specification by a nominated independent and competent person (ICP); an important independent check that safety has been properly addressed in the design process. 3. How safety is demonstrated In a goal setting regime, responsibility is placed on the risk generators to demonstrate that installations are safe and formal safety assessments are an essential input to this. Historically, the process of assessing the safety of a major design has been to undertake a comprehensive technical analysis of the safety built into the design. This often involves a detailed assessment of the potential hazards and risks that the plant may experience. Such studies typically include comprehensive hazard identification reviews, often in the form of a HAZID or HAZOP, combined with the use of appropriate national and international codes and standards to guide design criteria. Ideally, the outputs from these studies inform safety decision making and enable the design team to create an installation in which the design and operating risks have been reduced to a level which is as low as it is reasonably practicable to achieve at the design stage. In practice, however, implementations of design safety procedures involve a considerable amount of work and most importantly can only be done thoroughly when a significant proportion of the design is complete. Consequently, one of the key challenges for the Regulator and client alike is to discriminate between good and bad design safety features accurately and early in the design and construction process. However, this has proven to be difficult by conventional means. The reason why this is the case is that no matter how sophisticated the technical safety assessment tools and methods are, if they focus on assessment of the “product of design” itself, safety decisions will always have to wait for engineering details to be defined. By the very nature of the design process, this will inevitably occur late in the design process once the main design features have been agreed. Indeed the conventional advice for application of HAZOP (Chemical Industries Association, 1992) is to wait until “design freeze” when sufficient design detail will be available to support the execution of a HAZOP. While at this stage, design change is less costly than changes made during construction or operation, it is still very expensive to make any but the most minor of design changes and is often resisted by powerful project managers who are rewarded for meeting tightly controlled cost and delivery targets. In order to provide a degree of assurance that the design process will deliver a safe product at a very early stage in a project, a radically different approach to “safety assurance” is required. Preliminary thinking within the HSE and the design safety community (based on brainstorming sessions with design engineers and HSE inspectors) doubted that further refinement of the technical and HAZOP (type) assessment processes would be capable of delivering the high level assessments needed for early safety decision making and it was felt that a more fruitful approach would be to focus on the safety management processes rather than on formal safety assessments i.e. to shift the attention away from safety assessment of “product” to the assessment of the “process” that delivers the safe product. The capability of the organisation to manage the design for safety processes then becomes critically important and has led the authors to investigate the use of management performance indicators and capability maturity models. This represents a key shift in the assurance strategy of the regulator. |