دانلود ترجمه مقاله تداوم تورم، سیاست اختیاری و بدهی دولت – مجله الزویر

• فهرست مطالب:

 چکیده
۱ مقدمه
۲ مدل
۲ ۱ بخش خصوصی
۲ ۲ دولت
۲ ۳ تعادل بخش خصوصی
۳ مسئله سیاست بهینه
۴ راه حل عددی و واسنجی
۵ نتایج
۵ ۱ پویایی سیاست بهینه و دوام تورم
۵ ۲ پویایی بدهی معکوس کننده میانگین
۶ منابع مربوطه
۷ نتیجه گیری

• بخشی از ترجمه:

این مقاله به بررسی خصوصیات دینامیکی تورم در یک مدل سیاست پولی و اقتصادی بهینه تحت اختیار پرداخت. در این مدل،  یک دولت خیر خواه وجود دارد که تنها از ابزار های مالیاتی اختیاری استفاده می کند ولی بدهی های اسمی را برای تغییر  اختلاس ها طی زمان صادر می کند. محرک های اختیاری دولت برای کاهش ارزش واقعی بدهی عمومی اسمی توسط تورم شگفتی موجب تحریک انتظارات تورمی شده و در وهله بعدی، نرخ تورم متعادل  همبستکی بالایی را با سهام بدهی عمومی پیدا می کند. بدهی به نوبه خود، بسیار پایدار   و با ثبات می باشد و موجب می شود تا  هموار سازی مالیاتی در معرض اختلال قرار بگیرد. به دلیل همبستگی فوق الذ کر، دوام و ثبات در بدهی بر تورم غلبه می کند.   تحلیل ما به بررسی اثرات غیر یکنواخت  انعطاف ناپذیری های اسمی بر دوام تورم پرداخته و نشان می دهد که بدهی دولت نشان دهنده  خواص تصادفی نزدیک  مشابه از  منابع رامسی نمی باشد. یک نسخه واسنجی شده از مدل که، درجه متوسط رقابت وابسته به صاحب انحصار  را در  نظر می گیرد و چسبندگی قیمت از نظر کمی مطابق با دینامیک های تورمی تجربه شده در امریکا از زمان کاهش تورم والکر در اوایل ۱۹۸۰ میلادی است.

• بخشی از مقاله انگلیسی:

Introduction Ramsey models of optimal fiscal and monetary policy typically predict inflation rates that are negative on average and display almost zero persistence (Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1991; Khan, King, and Wolman, 2003; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004, 2010; Siu, 2004). This empirically implausible prediction has recently been stressed by Chugh (2007), who shows that an otherwise standard model augmented with habits-in-consumption and physical capital accumulation can generate substantial inflation persistence under Ramsey policies. In his model, an increased preference or ability to smooth consumption over time leads to a highly persistent real interest rate; a persistent real interest rate, in turn, implies a persistent inflation rate by the Fisher relationship. The present paper describes an alternative mechanism that generates realistic inflation persistence. We study a fairly standard sticky-price model and argue that optimal inflation rates are highly persistent if policies are implemented under discretion rather than commitment. Key to this result is the government’s discretionary incentive to erode the real value of outstanding liabilities by means of surprise inflation. This incentive renders inflation expectations and, in further consequence, equilibrium inflation rates correlated with the level of outstanding debt. Since optimal policies use public debt as a means to smooth tax distortions over time, it displays a high degree of persistence. Due to the aforementioned correlation, this persistence carries over to inflation. Nominal rigidities affect optimal inflation persistence in a non-monotonic way, as two opposing effects are at work. On the one hand, the correlation between debt and inflation becomes weaker as price variations become more costly. On the other hand, the persistence of debt under optimal policies increases in the presence of nominal rigidities: When price adjustments are costly, the policy-maker refrains from using inflation as a shock absorber but uses persistent changes in debt to smooth the effects of shocks over time. Whether an increase in price stickiness raises or lowers inflation persistence therefore depends on which of the two effects is stronger. For a calibrated economy, we show that at very low levels of price stickiness the reduced correlation effect dominates, such that inflation persistence decreases in the amount of price stickiness. At higher levels of price stickiness, the debt persistence effect dominates and inflation persistence accordingly increases. The inflation dynamics generated from our calibrated economy are quantitatively consistent with empirical data for the U.S. since the Volcker disinflation. Our results also indicate that the dynamic properties of debt under optimal discretionary policy are qualitatively different from those under commitment. Under commitment, debt is used by the government to smooth the distortionary effects of shocks over time and displays a near-random walk property, i.e., temporary innovations to the public budget are financed 2 by permanent changes in taxes and debt (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004). Under discretion, variations in the stock of debt in response to adverse shocks are costly, as they induce increased inflation expectations. These, in turn, lead to higher realized inflation rates in equilibrium and therefore higher price adjustment costs and higher nominal interest rate distortions. In light of these costs, the government optimally decides to keep debt in close vicinity of its steady state level. Importantly, this implies that unlike in the Ramsey framework temporary innovations in the public budget are not financed by permanent changes in taxes and debt, i.e., the near-random walk behavior of taxes and debt observed under commitment is overturned under discretion.

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